

National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East War, 26 October, 1943 — File No. Q1

9

| DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT] | | | | |
|--|---------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|-------------|
| DOCUMENT NUMBER | DOCUMENT TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS | DATE | RESTRICTION |
| 1 | telegram | Amemb Amman to Sec State | 10/26/73 | B |
| 2 | reports | Situation Reports | 10/26/73 | B |
| 3 | cable | Amemb Amman to Sec State | 10/26/73 | B |
| 4 | report | Intelligence Information Cable | 10/26/73 | B |
| 5 | telegram | Amemb Amman to Sec State | 10/26/73 | B |
| FILE GROUP TITLE NSC | | | BOX NUMBER 1175 | |
| FOLDER TITLE (9) | | | | |

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
 B. National security classified information.
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
 D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION 5770

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

October 26, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
WILLIAM B. QUANDT
SUBJECT: Authorization for US Government to
Underwrite War Risk Insurance in
Middle East Contingencies

The State Department has requested that the President instruct the Department of Commerce to issue war risk insurance to the Department of State. This act is necessary in the event that the evacuation of US citizens from the Middle East becomes imperative.

Fred Fielding concurs.

RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the attached memo to the President.

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION 5770

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Authorization for US Government to
Underwrite War Risk Insurance in
Middle East Contingencies

In attempting to charter a ship to remove several hundred American tourists from Egypt during the present hostilities, the State Department discovered that commercial insurance companies have ceased issuing war risk insurance for vessels entering the war zone decreed by the Egyptian government. The immediate problem of removing these tourists has been solved, but the possibility remains that further evacuation efforts could be stalled unless the US Government can underwrite the insurance for shipping in this area.

The Department of Commerce has authority to issue the necessary insurance to agencies of the Government that you choose to designate. The Department of State is not now so designated. The attached memorandum from you to the Secretary of State would permit the Department of State to obtain the necessary coverage from the Department of Commerce.

Fred Fielding concurs.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the attached memorandum.

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Authorization for the Department of
State to Obtain War Insurance from
the Department of Commerce

In accordance with Title 46 of the United States Code section 1285, I hereby approve the procurement by the Department of State from the Secretary of Commerce of any of the insurance provided for in subchapter XII of Title 49 of the United States Code and prescribe that the Department of State is an agency authorized to obtain such insurance without premium by agreement to indemnify the Secretary of Commerce against all losses covered by that insurance.

CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)

For tomorrow

TRANSMITTED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)

Alc

URGENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT

S/S # 7319504

RECEIVED BY:

(Date & Time Stamp) *SE*
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

'73 OCT 16 PM 6:56

LDX MESSAGE NO. 367, CLASSIFICATION CONF, NO. PAGES 2

DESCRIPTION OF MSG. Pickup aircraft - re designation of State

FROM: S/S-S L. Sekemur *as recipient of Dept Commerce war insurance*

| Officer | Office Symbol | Extension | Room Number |
|-----------|----------------|-----------|-------------|
| <u>WH</u> | <u>J Davis</u> | | |
| | | | |
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LDX TO: _____ DELIVER TO: _____ EXTENSION: _____ ROOM NUMBER: _____

FOR: Action CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: Original to follow (FAM procedure)

VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY: *[Signature]*
Executive Secretariat Officer

S/S 7319504

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

October 16, 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIG. GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

In attempting to charter a Greek ship to remove several hundred American tourists from Egypt, where they have been stranded since the outbreak of hostilities, we learned that commercial companies have ceased issuing war risk insurance for vessels entering the war zone decreed by the Egyptian Government. Our immediate problem has been solved; we now have a charter with a Greek company to sail into Alexandria on October 18 with the company assuming the responsibility of obtaining whatever insurance is available.

In discussing possible future need of a vessel for evacuation in more critical circumstances, our Mission in Cairo asked that steps be taken to permit the U.S. Government to underwrite the insurance for such a voyage.

The Department of Commerce has authority to issue the necessary insurance to agencies of the Government designated by the President. The Department of State is not now so designated; the attached proposed memorandum for the Secretary from the President would permit us to obtain the necessary coverage from the Department of Commerce.

J. R. Pickering
Thomas R. Pickering
Executive Secretary

Attachment: (1) Proposed Memorandum for the Secretary
from the President

Memorandum for the Secretary of State
Subject: Authorization for Department of State to obtain
insurance from
PROPOSED MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE
Department of Commerce

In accordance with Title 46 of the United States Code section 1285, I hereby approve the procurement by the Department of State from the Secretary of Commerce of any of the insurance provided for in subchapter XII of Title 49 of the United States Code and prescribe that the Department of State is an agency authorized to obtain such insurance without premium by agreement to indemnify the Secretary of Commerce against all losses covered by that insurance.


Richard Nixon

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 287

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 USSS-00

CCO-00 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01 USIE-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 PA-04 PRS-01 NEA-10

IO-14 AF-10 DRC-01 /117 W

087575

O 261436Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3416

UNCLAS MOSCOW 13432

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR UR US XF
SUBJ: BREZHNEV ON ME

1. IN SPEECH TO CONGRESS OF PEACE FORCES TODAY
BREZHNEV SAID: "PRESIDENT OF EGYPT SADAT TURNED TO
USSR AND U.S. WITH REQUEST TO SEND TO REGION OF
MILITARY ACTIVITY THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN ORDER TO
SEE THROUGH FULFILLMENT (NABLYUDAT ZA VIPOLNYENIYEM) OF SC DECISION
OF CEASE-FIRE, WE EXPRESSED OUR READINESS TO SATISFY EGYPT'S REQUEST
AND WE HAVE ALREADY SENT SUCH REPRESENTATIVES, WE
HOPE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL PROCEED IN SIMILAR
WAY."

2. FURTHER REPORTING ON SPEECH FOLLOWS.
DUBS

UNCLASSIFIED



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 13439 261524Z

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 NEA-10 IO-14 AF-10 SSO-00

NSCE-00 INRE-00 USSS-00 CCO-00 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03

SS-20 RSC-01 USIE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00

PA-04 PRS-01 DRC-01 /117 W

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O 261506Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3422

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 13439

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR UR
SUBJ: INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET "REPRESENTATIVES"
TO ME

REF: MOSCOW 13432

AFTER HEARING SOMEWHAT AMBIGUOUS REFERENCE IN BREZHNEV
SPEECH (REFTEL) TO SOVIET "REPRESENTATIVES" WHO HAVE
BEEN SENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST, I TELEPHONED KORNIYENKO,
CHIEF US DIVISION, WHO SAID THAT REPRESENTATIVES
REFERRED TO BY BREZHNEV "CAN BE CONSIDERED OBSERVERS."
DUBS

CONFIDENTIAL
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Department of State

War
TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 627

PAGE 01 STATE 211660

62
ORIGIN AF-18

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEA-10 PM-07 NSC-10 SPC-03 SS-20 RSC-01

IO-14 PRS-01 /085 R

DRAFTED BY AF/E:BCROGERS:CRJ
APPROVED BY AF:CGROSS
NEA:MR. ATHERTON
AF/E: MR. COOTE
S/S - MR. GAMMON
NSC - MR. HORAN

R 261940Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

***** 089805

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 211660

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR, SO, US, XF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO SIAD'S TELEGRAM
1. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING REPLY FROM PRESIDENT
TO SIAD IN LETTER FORMAT:

2. QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: AS YOU KNOW, I SHARE YOUR
DEEP CONCERN OVER THE TROUBLED SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE
EAST. BY THIS TIME, I AM SURE THAT YOU HAVE LEARNED THAT
REPORTS YOU RECEIVED ALLEGING AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVEN-
TION IN THE MIDDLE EAST WERE FALSE.

3. THE UNITED STATES HAS CONCENTRATED ITS ENERGIES ON
DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO ARRANGE AN END TO THE HOSTILITIES AND
TO LAY A BASIS FOR A JUST AND LASTING PEACE. IN COOPERA-
TION WITH THE USSR, WE HAVE ACTED DECISIVELY IN THE UNITED
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL TO ARRANGE A CEASE-FIRE AND TO
PROVIDE FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED
UNDER APPROPRIATE AUSPICES ON WAYS TO IMPLEMENT UNITED NA-
TIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242.

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PAGE 02 STATE 211660

4. SINCE THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS NOW CALLED FOR A CEASE-FIRE, I HOPE THAT THE SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND OTHER NATIONS WHICH ARE SIMILARLY CONCERNED ABOUT A SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE WILL GIVE THEIR SUPPORT TO THE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A LASTING SETTLEMENT WHICH WILL BRING PEACE

AND STABILITY TO THE AREA. SINCERELY,
RICHARD NIXON. UNQUOTE.

5. USG DOES NOT PLAN TO PUBLICIZE RESPONSE BUT WOULD NOT OBJECT IF GSDR DID SO.

6. DECONTROL UPON RECEIPT. KISSINGER

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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S/S (3)

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CIA (LDX)

NSA (LDX)

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SCI

SECRET/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report # 67

10/26/73

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1800 EDT,

Military Situation

With the exception of fighting near Suez City, ground forces on both fronts appear to be observing the ceasefire. The Israelis claim that the Egyptian Third Army on the East Bank continues to be totally cut off. However, there has been no indication of mass surrenders on the part of the Third Army.

Israel's airfire was directed against fedayeen targets along the Israeli-Lebanese border. However, we have reports the GOL is making efforts to control the fedayeen. Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Allon told us that fedayeen attacks on the Lebanon-Israel border are tapering off. There is no evidence of any ground or air activity on the Syrian front.

A heavy volume of IDF equipment has been noted moving on roads across bridges on the Suez Canal into the IDF controlled area on the Western Front. The IDF currently controls three bridges across the Canal.

Iraqi Forces Reported to Depart from Syria

According to King Hussein and Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai, the Syrian Foreign Minister informed Arab ambassadors in Damascus on October 26 that all Iraqi Air Force units had departed Syria and that the Iraqi Regional Command had decided to withdraw all ground forces from Syria. The Syrians reportedly tried to reverse this decision and asked the Arab ambassadors to have their governments pressure Baghdad to keep Iraqi forces in Syria until peace materializes or should war break out again. So far, all efforts to pressure the Iraqis seem to have been unsuccessful.

SECRET/EXDIS
GDS - DECLAS Dec. 31, 1981

War

SECRET/EXDIS

2.

UNEF

550 UN peacekeeping troops have departed from Cyprus for the Middle East to form the first provisional contingents of UNEF. As requested by the SYG and approved by the UNSC yesterday, the contingents are from Austria, Finland, and Sweden. We have received further responses to our queries to posts about their estimates of the availability of troops and logistical support for the UNEF. Argentina might well contribute 150-700 troops who would require airlift assistance. In accordance with a previous agreement with the UN, Sweden has committed 1600 troops on a stand-by basis to UN peacekeeping operations, 300 of which have been alerted for an immediate call up. Ireland would transfer its company of about 140 men from Cyprus. Canada's First Airborne Regiment of about 900 troops could depart within 24 hours of notification. Greece could airlift one battalion of light infantry with organic equipment. New Zealand could provide a small contingent. Belgium could airlift about 700 men from a paracommando regiment within 48 hours of notification. Belgium proposed that the EC 9 offer a European Peace Force to UNEF but Denmark objected and the plan was dropped.

We have alerted appropriate governments of possible requests to them for overflight and landing rights for USAF operating for and under auspices of UN in connection with establishment of UNEF. We have received favorable replies or indications from Greece, Turkey, Italy, Belgium, Great Britain, Austria, Malta, and Mauritius. We have overflight rights in Liberia. In view of the negative attitude of the Libyan Government, we do not at present plan to ask the latter for overflight permission.

The UN SYG issued his report (S/11052) on the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East in accordance with SC Resolution 340, which sets forth the main following principles for SC approval:

The Force will be under the command of the UN, vested in the SYG, under the authority of the SC. The SC will decide upon all matters which may affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force. UNEF will avoid action which could prejudice the rights, claims or positions of the parties.

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET/EXDIS

3.

The contingents, totalling about 7000 troops, will be selected in consultation with the SC and the parties, bearing in mind an adequate geographical distribution. UNEF shall not use force except in self-defense and will have defensive weapons only. The SYG has appointed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major General Siilasvuo, interim commander of UNEF. The Force, which will be stationed initially for six months will cost about \$30 million, the expenses to be assumed by the UN members as apportioned by the UNGA.

The SYG will request logistic support from a number of UN members possibly including the Permanent Members of the SC.

Israelis Capture Soviet Pilots

We have a report from an Israeli Air Force pilot that the IAF had captured two Soviet MIG pilots who are currently being detained.

UN Security Council Meetings

The Egyptians requested another meeting of the UNSC which is presently in session to discuss ceasefire violations.

U.S. Military Petroleum Supplies

According to the JCS, the current status of U.S. military petroleum supplies has been critically affected by the Israeli conflict. The OAPC has cut off petroleum shipments to the U.S. and has decided progressively to restrict shipments to other countries. The Bahrainis and Saudis have refused to load tankers with U.S. military products for delivery to U.S. forces worldwide. The Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) estimates that up to 37% of anticipated petroleum supplies could be cut off and that resupply is uncertain and unreliable. Impact varies from theater to theater. CINCPAC now relies on Arabian oil for 91% of its requirements and will be the most seriously affected. The DFSC is attempting to obtain additional products from non-Arab sources. U.S. military commands have been requested to estimate their absolutely minimum essential operating requirements through the end of 1973 and to provide an estimate of anticipated shortage and the impact of these shortages.

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SECRET/EXDIS

4.

Heykel Accuses U.S.

Mohammed Hassanein Heykel, editor of the influential Cairo newspaper Al Ahram stated in his October 26 column that President Sadat has accused the United States of direct intervention in the Arab/Israeli fighting. Heykel quoted Sadat as saying, "We have dealt the Israelis a blow that they will never forget, but now the United States is in the war against us.My sons (Egyptian troops) have defeated Israel when both sides were without help. But I cannot order them to continue the war against the United States..." Heykel said huge U.S. Galaxy transports carrying tanks had landed at the el Arish airfield and were driven straight to the battlefield. As for the psychological climate in Cairo, USINT Cairo reports that educated Egyptians currently believe Egypt has achieved a victory, albeit tarnished and that there is no apparent loss of confidence in Egypt's political and military leadership. However, this situation could change if there are certain serious military reverses such as the fall of Suez City, bombing of Cairo, or the surrender or destruction of Egypt's Third Army.

Attitude of Israel's Labor Alignment Leadership Towards the Middle East Situation

Prime Minister Meir and Minister of Defense Dayan met on October 25 with the Labor Alignment Leadership. They both said, in effect, that U.S. action in producing UN Resolution 338 and Israel's rapid acceptance of it were wise moves militarily and politically, in terms of both preserving indispensable U.S. support of Israel and seeking a political settlement in the region. Embassy Tel Aviv thinks that Israeli leadership is willing to grant the possibility that now the U.S. will be able to organize a meaningful negotiating process, despite a lack of any optimism that a solution to the Middle East conflict may be in sight. Ambassador Keating thinks that elements are present at this moment which might facilitate the U.S. role of leading Israel into difficult negotiations; more so than may prove to be the case a few weeks from now.

Algerian Boycott

West German sources report that Algerian dock workers in Algiers have decided to boycott West German ships and, consequently, German containers are not being loaded.

SECRET/EXDIS

APPROVED BY: _____

DEPUTY IN CHARGE, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION



Department of State

War
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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSD-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

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O 262020Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2392

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 5179

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, XF, NATO
SUBJECT: U.S. ACTION REGARDING MIDDLE EAST, COUNCIL MEETING OCTOBER 25

REF: (A) STATE 2113107
(B) STATE 211307 (EXDIS);
(C) USNATO 5123 (NODIS)

SUMMARY: AT OCTOBER 26 SPECIAL COUNCIL MEETING ON THE MIDDLE EAST, FRANCE SHARPLY CRITICIZED THE U.S. FOR NOT INFORMING AND CONSULTING WITH THE COUNCIL ON DETAILS OF US-USSR BILATERAL CONTACT WHILE U.S. WAS AT THE SAME TIME CALLING FOR ALLIED SOLIDARITY AND FOR ALLIED PRESSURES ON THE SOVIET UNION. ON PERSONAL BASIS BELGIAN AND ITALIAN PERMREPS ECHOED FRENCH LINE. UK AND DUTCH REPS WHILE NOT DISAGREEING, EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF US AND NEED FOR SECRECY. OTHER REPS WERE SILENT. RUMSFELD MADE GENERAL STATEMENT STRESSING THAT OUR OBJECTIVE ON OCTOBER 25 HAD BEEN TO BRING PRESSURE TO PREVENT AN INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET FORCES INTO THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO OBTAIN PASSAGE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION THAT WOULD PRECLUDE IT. THESE STEPS, HE SAID, ARE IN THE ALLIANCE INTEREST AND WARRANT ALLIED SUPPORT. RUMSFELD INDICATED HE WOULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONS SINCE THE FRENCH CRITICISMS WERE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS. ACTION REQUESTED: INSTRUCTIONS AS REQUESTED IN REF C.
END SUMMARY.

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SECRET

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1. THE SPECIAL COUNCIL MEETING BEGAN WITH MILITARY BRIEFING BY GENERAL STEINHOFF WHICH INCLUDED MENTION OF THE LIFTING OF THE U.S. MILITARY ALERT IN THE CARIBBEAN AND ALASKA, (OF WHICH USNATO HAD NOT BEEN NOTIFIED) AND THE CONCLUSION THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES

THERE WAS NOW NO NEED FOR NATO ALERT MEASURES. THE BRIEFING ALSO MENTIONED A PRESS REPORT QUOTING AN AMERICAN OFFICER AS SAYING THAT U.S. MILITARY ALERT HAD BEEN KEPT IN FORCE IN ORDER TO MAKE THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND HOW SERIOUSLY WE VIEW THEIR THREATENED ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. (USNATO HAS NOT SEEN THIS PRESS ITEM).

2. THE FRENCH PERMREP (DE ROSE) THEN TOOK THE FLOOR AND, SPEAKING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS, SHARPLY CRITICIZED THE UNITED STATES FOR ITS ACTIONS AND INACTIONS IN THE COUNCIL DURING THE COURSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. DE ROSE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HIS AUTHORITIES IN PARIS WERE SURPRISED BY TWO THINGS THAT TOOK PLACE YESTERDAY (OCTOBER 25), THE GENERAL CONDUCT OF AFFAIRS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. DE ROSE SAID THAT, IN FACT, HIS GOVERNMENT KNOWS NOTHING OF WHAT IS GOING ON BETWEEN THE SUPER-POWERS

THE ALLIES ARE SIMPLY NOT BEING KEPT INFORMED EITHER IN THE COUNCIL OR IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIETS.

3. DE ROSE CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NOTED THAT LAST WEEK RUMSFELD ASKED THE ALLIES NOT ONLY TO DEMONSTRATE ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY BY MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT THE DANGERS TO DETENTE OF SOVIET MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVES, -BUT HE ALSO INVITED THE ALLIES TO CONSIDER MEASURES OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON MOSCOW AND EAST EUROPEAN CAPITALS. FURTHERMORE, THESE MEASURES WERE TO BE UNDERTAKEN NOT ONLY WITH REGARD TO AN AFFAIR THAT WAS OUTSIDE THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF NATO CONCERN, BUT ALSO TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY ALLIES WHO WERE COMPLETELY IGNORANT OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EXCHANGES THAT WERE THEN GOING ON BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION.

4. IN THE FIRST PLACE, DE ROSE CONTINUED, FRANCE IS

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OF THE OPINION THAT THERE IS NO PRINCIPLE REQUIREING COMMON NATO POLICY WITH REGARD TO MATTERS OUTSIDE THE GEOGRAPHICAL TREATY AREA. THUS, WHEN ALLIES ARE INVITED TO DEMONSTRATE SOLIDARITY AND TAKE ACTIONS WITH REGARD TO SUCH MATTERS, MATTERS ON WHICH THE ALLIES DO NOT EVEN KNOW THE ESSENTIALS, THEN THERE SHOULD BE FULL CONSULTATIONS. IN THE SITUATION YESTERDAY, HOWEVER, THERE WAS ALL THE MORE NEED FOR CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE COUNCIL BECAUSE IT REFERRED TO AN ALERT WHICH TOOK PLACE IN EUROPE.

5. DE ROSE RECALLED THAT THE SITUATION YESTERDAY WAS SIMILAR TO THAT LAST WEEK WHEN THERE WERE SUDDEN DEVELOPMENTS WHICH APPARENTLY TOOK PLACE ON THE BASIS OF A MESSAGE WHICH DOBRYNIN DELIVERED IN WASHINGTON. HE SAID THAT THE ALLIES ONLY KNOW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE MESSAGE BUT NOTHING OF ITS SUBSTANCE.

6. DE ROSE WENT ON TO SAY THAT LAST WEEK THE COUNCIL HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS BEING ASKED TO UNDERTAKE THE DIFFICULT TASK OF TRYING TO FOLLOW THE U.S. RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION WITHOUT THE NECESSARY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION. DESPITE THIS, HE SAID,



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

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FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2393

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 5179

EXDIS

YESTERDAY THE ALLIES WERE CONFRONTED WITH AN EVEN MORE SERIOUS CRISIS, YET AGAIN THEY WERE KEPT UNINFORMED OF THE BACKGROUND OF THE DECISIONS WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN.

7. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THESE ACTIONS RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS UPON WHICH THE COUNCIL SHOULD REFLECT. HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT INSTRUCTED HIM TO CALL THEM TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COUNCIL. DE ROSE RHETORICALLY ASKED "IS THIS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A POLICY WHICH MIGHT BE CALLED THE POLICY OF JUNE 22, 1973?"

(THE REFERENCE, OF COURSE, IS TO THE DATE OF THE U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR). "WILL THE U.S. IN TIME OF CRISIS SEEK A CLOSER CONSULTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAN WITH ITS ALLIES?"

8. IN VIEW OF THIS SITUATION, DE ROSE WONDERED WHAT IS THE SENSE OF ALL THE WORK WHICH IS PRESENTLY BEING UNDERTAKEN IN SEEKING A NEW ATLANTIC DECLARATION BY THE 14--A DECLARATION WHICH WOULD EMPHASIZE THE VALUE OF CONSULTATIONS.

9. ACTING DYG PANSA SAID HE AGREED THERE WERE MOST SERIOUS MATTERS.

10. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) SAID THAT WHILE HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS, HIS PERSONAL REACTION WAS ALONG THE SAME LINES AS THAT OF THE FRENCH PERMREP, WHO HE SAID HAD RAISED "EXTREMELY GRAVE PROBLEMS," WHICH ARE ON THE MINDS OF EVERYONE. DE STAERCKE SAID HE WOULD



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SECRET

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RESTATE ONE OF DE ROSE'S QUESTIONS AS FOLLOWS: "WILL CONSULATIONS BETWEEN FRIENDS NECESSARILY HAVE TO TAKE PLACE AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH ENEMIES?" DE STAERCKE THEN SAID ONE OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS OF ALLIES IS TO AVOID BEING "MANIPULATED" AND THEN ONLY LATER LEARNING WHAT THE MATTER IS ALL ABOUT.

11. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IF THERE IS A QUESTION OF MILITARY ACTION BEING TAKEN BY ONE ALLY WHICH MIGHT HAVE CONSEQUENCES ON ALL OF THE OTHERS, THERE IS A DUTY, A LEGAL AND MORAL OBLIGATION, TO CONSULT. THIS PRINCIPLE, HE FELT, WAS "OBLIGINGLY OBVIOUS."

12. THE ITALIAN PERMREP (CATALANO) ALSO SPEAKING ON A PERSONAL BASIS, SAID THAT THE FEELINGS EXPRESSED BY THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CERTAINLY WILL FIND ECHO WITHIN CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT. CATALANO SAID THAT SINCE U.S. MILITARY BASES IN ITALY WHERE THE U.S. ALERT TOOK PLACE ARE NEAR SMALL ITALIAN TOWNS, IT WAS NO SECRET TO THE LOCAL CITIZENRY WHAT WAS HAPPENING, YET THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT COULD TELL ITS PEOPLE NOTHING.

13. ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS WITHIN THE LAST FORTNIGHT, CATALANO SAID, THE ALLIES HAVE BEEN ASKED TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH THE U.S. HE HOPED THAT IN A POST-MORTEM OF THIS WHOLE PERIOD, THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WILL BE ABLE TO TELL THE COUNCIL OF THE RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS AND HOW THEY WERE ARRIVED AT. IN ONE RESPECT CATALANO SAID HE WOULD GO EVEN FURTHER THAN THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR BY ASKING THAT THERE BE A EVALUATION OF WHAT HAPPENED YESTERDAY.

14. CATALANO WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT INDICATIONS IN STEINHOFF'S MILITARY BRIEFINGS OF SUBSTANTIAL TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION BY ISRAELI TROOPS IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE TWO CEASE-FIRES. HE WONDERED WHAT WERE THE TRUE FACTS AND WHAT THE IMPLICATIONS WOULD BE IF INDEED THE ISRAELIS HAD PROFITED FROM THE CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS.

15. THE UK PERMREP (PECK), SPEAKING ON A PERSONAL BASIS, SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD AND TO A CERTAIN EXTENT SHARED THE FEELINGS OF HIS FRENCH, BELGIAN AND ITALIAN COLLEAGUES. HOWEVER, PECK SAID OBVIOUSLY THERE IS A PROBLEM OF STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN GETTING RESULTS AND SHARING INFORMATION WITH ALLIES. PECK SAID HE UNDERSTANDS THE ROLE AND PROBLEMS OF A SUPER-POWER, BRITAIN ONCE HAVING



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BEEN IN A ANALOGUOUS POSITION; HTHEREFORE, HE COULD APPRECIATE THE NEED FOR SECRECY IF ONE WAS TO GET RESULTS; AND HE ADDED, INDEED, IT APPEARED THAT THE U.S. DID GET RESULTS. UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, PECK SAID, THERE SIMPLY HAD TO BE A SINGLE HAND ON THE DRIVING WHEEL--NOT 15 HANDS.

16. HE WENT ON, HOWEVER, TO QUESTION WHETHER THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN A CASE WHERE THE AMERICANS OVER-REACTED A BIT BY WORLDWIDE ALERTS WHICH HE NOTED WERE ALREADY BEGINNING TO BE STOOD DOWN ONLY 24 HOURS LATER. HE REPEATED THAT HE HIMSELF DID NOT KNOW THE ANSWER BUT HE DID UNDERSTAND THE NEED ON THE ONE HAND FOR SECRECY AND ON THE OTHER FOR CONSULTATIONS.

17. PECK THEN REQUESTED FURTHER PRECISION ON WHETHER SACEUR (GENERAL GOODPASTOR) HAD VOLUNTEERED YESTERDAY TO CONSULT THE COUNCIL BEFORE ANY NATO MILITARY READINESS MEASURES WERE TAKEN OR WHETHER HE WAS REQUIRED TO DO SO. GENERAL STEINHOFF INDICATED THAT SACEUR HAS THE PREROGATIVE TO TAKE CERTAIN ALERTING STEPS ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY ("MILITARY VIGILANCE") BUT IN THE SPECIFIC EVENTS OF YESTERDAY, HE HAD VOLUNTEERED THAT HE WOULD FIRST CONSULT WITH THE COUNCIL BEFORE ANY NATO MILITARY VIGILANCE MEASURES WERE TAKEN.


18. THE DUTCH CHARGE (BUWALDA) MADE TWO POINTS:

A) HIS FOREIGN MINISTER WAS PREPARED TO JOIN IN A DEMONSTRATION OF THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE, AND HE UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFICULTIES WITH WHICH THE U.S. WAS CONFRONTED IN THIS MATTER;

B) SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, SHARED THE DOUBTS WHICH HAD BEEN EXPRESSED BY THE FRENCH AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES.

19. THERE BEING NO FURTHER COMMENTS BY OTHER DELEGATES, AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD MADE A RESPONSE IN THREE PARTS. FIRST, HE DREW UPON REF A, STATING THE POSSIBILITY OF REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT IN MEETING OVERFLIGHT AND LANDING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE U.S. A.F. AIRLIFT AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR 7,000 MAN EMERGENCY FORCE, OPERATING FOR AND UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE U.N.

20. THEN, DRAWING ON PARA 2, REF B, AND SPECIFYING THAT HE WAS



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SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS, RUMSFELD STRESSED THAT THE ISSUE AT STAKE IN THIS MOST RECENT SITUATION IS THE QUESTION OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. OUR OBJECTIVE ON OCTOBER 25 WAS TO BRING PRESSURE TO PREVENT THIS AND TO INTRODUCE A SECURITY CONCIL RESOLUTION THAT WOULD PRECLUDE IT. WE FEEL THAT THESE STEPS ARE IN THE ALLIANCE INTEREST AND WARRANT ALLIED SUPPORT. THE PRESENT OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD HAVE, WE BELIEVE, A DIRECT IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY.

21. RUMSFELD THEN SAID WITH REGARD TO THE FRENCH COMMENTS JUST HEARD THAT HIS FIRST INCLINATION WAS TO RESPOND TO THEM BUT, RUMSFELD SAID IN



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ACTION SS-30

3

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

NSAE-00 INRE-00 /031 W

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FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2394

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 USNATO 5179

EXDIS

VIEW OF THE SUBSTANCE OF COMMENTS BY THE DEAN, THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE, AND THE ACTING SYG, HE FELT THERE WAS INTEREST IN HAVING NOT JUST HIS PERSONAL VIEWS, BUT MORE AUTHORITATIVE ONES AS WELL.

22. HE DID, HOWEVER, HAVE TWO POINTS. RUMSFELD SAID IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT IT WAS USEFUL THAT THESE MATTERS WHICH WERE BEING DISCUSSED IN THE PRESS WERE NOW ALSO BEING BROUGHT UP IN THE COUNCIL. SECONDLY, HE SAID, WITH REGARD TO THE NEED FOR SECRECY JUST UNDERLINED BY AMBASSADOR PECK, EVEN SOME OF THE THINGS WHICH TOOK PLACE YESTERDAY IN THE PRIVATE COUNCIL MEETING, WITH VIRTUALLY NO ONE BUT PERMREPS PRESENT, HAD ALREADY LEADED TO THE PRESS.

23. PANSA, ATTEMPTING TO SUMMARIZE, SAID THAT HE DETECTED GREAT AWARENESS ON THE PART OF THE COUNCIL THAT CONSULTATIONS ARE A NECESSARY PRE-REQUISITE FOR SOLIDARITY. AT THE SAME TIME, HE ALSO DETECTED AN AWARENESS OF THE SPECIAL POSITION OF THE U.S., AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE WIDE U.S. RESPONSIBILITIES EXTENDING BEYOND THE ALLIANCE, AND OF THE TIME FACTORS WITH WHICH THE U.S. IS SOMETIMES CONFRONTED. PANSA REPEATED THAT THE PROBLEM SEEMED TO BE ONE OF STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN SOLIDARITY AND CONSULTATIONS.

24. RUMSFELD THEN SAID "I TRUST THE AMABASSADOR OF FRANCE WILL CIRCULATE THAT STATEMENT HE MADE EARLIER."

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25. DE ROSE SAID THAT HE HAD MADE HIS DECLARATION ON THE BASIS OF TELEPHONE INSTRUCTIONS, HOWEVER, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE COUNCIL MINUTE-TAKER AND THE NOTES OF HIS DEPUTIES, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT HE COULD RECONSTRUCT A DOCUMENT THAT, WHILE NOT A FULL TEXT, AND NOT A GUARANTEED WORK-FOR-WORD STATEMENT OF WHAT HE JUST SAID, WOULD REFLECT THE SPIRIT OF WHAT HE HAD JUST SAID. HE DID NOT THINK HE COULD BET AROUND TO RECONSTRUCTING THE STATEMENT TODAY, HOWEVER.

26. THIS REPORT SHOULD BE READ IN CONNECTION WITH REPORT OF CONTINUATION OF DISCUSSION AT PERMREP LUNCH IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING (SEPTTEL).

27. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT TO EMBASSY PARIS AND OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED.
RUMSFELD

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WNR
TELEGRAM

OCT 26

Japan

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT=01 EUR=25 IO=14 ISO=00 CIAE=00 DODE=00 PM=07 H=03
INR=10 L=03 NSAE=00 NSC=10 PA=04 RSC=01 PRS=01 SPC=03
SS=20 USIA=15 ACDA=19 SSO=00 NSCE=00 AID=20 DRG=01
NEA=10 /181 W

085975

R 261005Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7755
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 13945

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS/ PFOR JA SA XF
SUBJ: JAPANESE RESPONSE TO ARAB APPROACH, ON ME
REF: TOKYO 13871

1. FONOFF DIRGEN ME AFFAIRS TANAKA CALLED POL COUNS ON
OCT 26 TO PROVIDE COPY OF NOTE VERBALE DATED OCT
25 TO AMBASSADOR SAUDI ARABIA (DEAN OF CORPS OF ARAB
AMBASSADORS IN JAPAN) RESPONDING TO NOTE FROM TEN ARAB
AMBASSADORS OCT 19 (REFTEL). TEXT OF SUBSTANTIVE
PARAGRAPHS OF FONOFF NOTE FOLLOWS: (ALL UNNECESSARY WORDS
OMITTED).

QTE 1. BASIC ATTITUDE OF JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TOWARDS
CURRENT ME HOSTILITIES HAS ALREADY BEEN CLARIFIED IN
STATEMENT DEPUTY CHIEF CABINET SECRETARY

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YAMASHITA OCT 8 AND LETTER OCT 17 FROM AMB
SAITO TO SEC GEN UN. MINISTRY WISHES CLARIFY IT FURTHER,
TAKING THIS OPPORTUNITY OF ADOPTION BY UNSC OF RESOLUTION
CALLING FOR CESSATION ALL HOSTILITIES AND ACCEPTANCE
BY EGYPT, SYRIA, AND ISRAEL.

(1) JAPANESE GOVERNMENT CATEGORICALLY OPPOSES ACQUISITION
TERRITORY BY FORCE AND CANNOT THEREFORE RECOGNIZE
ISRAEL'S PERPETRATION OF OCCUPATION, AND HER ANNEXATION OF
TERRITORIES SHE ACQUIRED IN WAR 1967. FROM THIS VIEW-
POINT JAPANESE GOVERNMENT BEEN INSISTING ON EXPEDITIOUS
AND COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION SC RES 242.

(2) IT EXTREMELY DEPLORABLE RECENT RECURRENCE OF
HOSTILITIES SHOULD HAVE BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT, ACCOMPANY-
ING MUCH LOSS HUMAN LIVES, IN CONSEQUENCE DELAY OF IM-
PLEMENTATION RES 242 AND PROLONGATION OF UNSETTLED
CONDITION OF DISPUTE. JAPAN HAS FULL UNDERSTANDING
AND SYMPATHY FOR DESIRE AND EFFORTS ARAB COUNTRIES TO
RECOVER THEIR TERRITORIES.

(3) IT GRATIFYING THAT CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN REALIZED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH RES ADOPTED BY SC OCT 22. JAPAN
ARDENTLY HOPES THAT TO PRECLUDE A RECURRENCE SUCH
BLOODSHED, NEGOTIATION FOR COMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION
SC RES 242 WILL BE IMMEDIATELY STARTED THROUGH
INITIATIVE OF UN OR OTHERS AND JUST AND LASTING SETTLE-
MENT WILL BE QUICKLY FOUND TO ME PROBLEM.

(4) JAPANESE GOVERNMENT ALSO TAKES POSITION THERE CAN
BE NO SETTLEMENT ME PROBLEM WITHOUT EQUITABLE SOLUTION
TO PALESTINE PROBLEM AND LEGITIMATE RIGHT OF PEOPLE
OF PALESTINE SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED ACCORDING CHARTER UN
AND WITHIN FRAMEWORK DECLARATION PRINCIPLES OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND COOPERA-
TION AMONG STATES. IT THEREFORE VOTED FOR RES CALLING
FOR EQUAL RIGHT AND SELF-DETERMINATION OF PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE AT GA UN EVERY YEAR SINCE 1971.

2. IN CONFORMITY WITH ABOVE MENTIONED BASIC ATTITUDE,
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DESIRES EARNEST EFFORTS OF UN AND

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MAJOR POWERS WHICH HAVE GREAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR PEACE OF REGION, IN ORDER THAT JUST AND LASTING PEACE BROUGHT ABOUT IN ME, AND INTENDS MAKE UTMOST CONTRIBUTION TO ATTAINMENT THAT END, BY KEEPING CLOSE CONTACT WITH COUNTRIES CONCERNED IN AND OUT OF UN. IT ALSO INTENDS CONTINUE TO ENDEAVOUR INCREASE ITS CONTRIBUTION TO UNRWA FOR RELIEF OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, WHILE EXTENDING AS MUCH ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION AS POSSIBLE FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF ARAB COUNTRIES. UNQTE.

2. IN COMMENTING ON FONOFF NOTE, TANAKA RECOUNTED INTENSIVE INTRA-MURAL DEBATE WITHIN FONOFF CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF TIMING AND SUBSTANCE OF GOJ RESPONSE TO ARAB'S APPROACH. TANAKA EMPHASIZED THAT ARAB PRESSURE HAS BEEN MOUNTING STEADILY. CULMINATION OF RECENT EVENTS, PARTICULARLY DESIGNATION OF JAPAN AS QTE ENEMY UNQTE STATE FINALLY PERSUADED FONOFF THAT WRITTEN QTE CLARIFICATION UNQTE OF GOJ POSITION AFTER CEASEFIRE NECESSARY. SAUDI AMBASSADOR THEREFORE CALLED IN BY HOGEN OCT 26 AND GIVEN ABOVE NOTE.

3. TANAKA SAID SAUDI AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED VIEW ARABS WOULD STILL NOT BE SATISFIED WITH GOJ POSITION. HE NOTED LACK OF SPECIFIC JAPANESE SUPPORT FOR ARAB POSITION ON TERRITORIES AND JAPANESE CALL FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL PROVISIONS OF UNSC RES.

4. IN CONCLUDING TANAKA SAID FONOFF NOT SURPRISED THAT ARABS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE DISSATISFIED WITH GOJ POSITION. THEY EXPECT TO CONTINUE TO RECEIVE PRESSURE, BUT DECISION WAS MADE, PARTICULARLY ON TERRITORIAL ISSUE, NOT TO MOVE FURTHER BEYOND RES 242 QTE AT THIS TIME UNQTE.

5. TANAKA SAID TEXT OF FONOFF NOTE AND INSTRUCTIONS RE CURRENT JAPANESE POSITIONS HAS BEEN CABLED TO JAPANESE EMBASSY WASHINGTON.
INGERSOLL

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

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O P 261440Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9844
INFO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

S E C R E T AMMAN 5706

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, JO, SY
SUBJ: SITUATION IN SYRIA

1. KING SAYS THAT SITUATION IS CONFUSED. HE HAS JUST HEARD FROM JORDANIAN CHARGE THERE THAT SYRIANS AND IRAQIS HAVE HAD A MAJOR QUARREL. IRAQIS ACCUSE SYRIANS OF ACCEPTING CEASE-FIRE WITHOUT CONSULTATION. THEY ARE THREATENING TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS.

2. I TOLD KING THAT THIS WAS A DELIGHTFUL BIT OF NEWS, IF TRUE. HE SAID HE WAITING RETURN OF AMER KHAMMASH TONIGHT. IF IRAQIS PULL OUT, HE WILL HESITATE A BIT BEFORE WITHDRAWING JORDANIAN TROOPS. HE ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT. I SAID, IF IRAQIS WITHDRAW IN ANGER, IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR AREA IF JORDANIANS LEFT IN A FRIENDLY WAY AND THAT A SHORT TIME GAP BETWEEN IRAQI DEPARTURE AND THAT OF JORDAN WOULD NOT BE BAD. IF, HOWEVER, IRAQIS STAY, GIVEN THEIR TEMPER, IT WOULD BE BEST OF JORDANIANS GOT OUT FAST.

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELD _____
V. L. G. _____
WALSH _____

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
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PAGE 02 AMMAN 05706 261451Z

3. KING ASKED THAT SECRETARY BE TOLD HE HAD LISTENED TO PRESS
CONFERENCE ON VOA AND THAT IT WAS A MAGNIFICENT PERFORMANCE.
BROWN

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ACTION NFA-12

INFO DCY-01 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 COME-00 ER-11 INR-10
LAF-06 NSAE-00 RSC-01 SIL-01 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00
INRE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 L-03 NSC-10 PA-04 PRS-01
SPC-03 SS-20 ACDA-19 DRC-01 EUR-25 /152 W
***** 086171

O R 261457Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0292
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 8654
SB O 116521 GDS
TAGS: PINT, IS
SUBJECT: ATTITUDE OF LABOR ALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP TOWARD MID EAST
SITUATION

SUMMARY: MRS MEIR AND DAYAN, MEETING LAST EVENING WITH
LABOR ALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP, SAID IN EFFECT THAT US ACTION IN
PRODUCING RES 338 AND ISRAEL'S RAPID ACCEPTANCE OF IT
WERE WISE MOVES MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY, IN TERMS OF BOTH
PRESERVING INDISPENSABLE US SUPPORT OF ISRAEL AND SEEKING
SETTLEMENT IN REGION. FROM ALL INDICATIONS, LEADERSHIP WAS
FULLY SATISFIED AND SHARES MRS MEIR'S PERSONAL TRUST IN
PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY. PRESENT MOMENT MAY BE MORE
AUSPICIOUS FOR MOVING GOI TOWARD MID EAST NEGOTIATIONS
THAN MAY BE CASE A FEW WEEKS FROM NOW. END SUMMARY.

1. IN ADDITION TO VIRTUALLY CONTINUOUS CABINET MEETING YESTERDAY
STARTING AT SIX IN MORNING, MRS MEIR CONVENED COMBINED
MEETING LAST EVENING OF LABOR ALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND
ALIGNMENT KNESSET FACTION. SHE AND DAYAN SPOKE.

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2. MRS MEIR REPORTEDLY SAID:

- A. ISRAEL HAD EMERGED FROM GREAT DANGER IN CONNECTION WITH US-SOVIET CONFRONTATION OVER ISSUE OF INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET TROOPS IN MID EAST
- B. DIRE CONSEQUENCES COULD HAVE ARISEN IF ISRAEL HAD NOT ACCEPTED CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL
- C. US AID TO ISRAEL HAD BEEN EXCELLENT; GOI ACCEPTANCE OF US INITIATIVE IN AUGUST 1970 HAD MADE ISRAEL'S DEFENSIVE BUILDUP OF PAST THREE YEARS POSSIBLE
- D. CURRENTLY SOVIET THREATS WERE BRUTAL AND WERE EVEN GRAVER THAN THOSE LEVELLED AGAINST ISRAEL BY BULGANIN IN 1956
- E. NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES WERE NOT YET IN SIGHT.

3. DAYAN REPORTEDLY SAID:

- A. ISRAEL COULD NOT AFFORD TO JEOPARDIZE US SUPPORT BY PREEMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION AT BEGINNING OF WAR
- B. IF ISRAEL HAD TURNED DOWN CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL, IT WOULD HAVE TAKEN ON GREATER DANGER THAN IT COULD AFFORD
- C. SPEED OF US-USSR INITIATIVE OCTOBER 20-11 HAD CAUSED DIFFICULTIES IN ISRAELI-US RELATIONS, BUT WEIGHED AGAINST THEM WERE TREMENDOUS MATERIAL ADVANTAGES FOR ISRAEL; US WAS PERHAPS ISRAEL'S ONLY REMAINING SUPPORT AGAINST ARABS
- D. ISRAELIS HAD TO REALIZE THAT FOR POLITICAL REASONS IDF COULD NOT INFLICT DESTRUCTION OF ARAB ARMIES AND THEIR WEAPONS
- E. WAR HAD LEFT ISRAEL IN GOOD STRATEGIC POSITION AND HAD LEFT ARABS INCAPABLE OF RENEWING ATTACK ON ISRAEL
- F. ISRAEL COULD NOT ACHIEVE POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF MID EAST CONFLICT BY OCCUPYING ARAB CAPITALS, AND GOI HAD NO INTENTION OF GOING THIS ROUTE.

4. WE NOTE THAT HAIM ZADOK, CHAIRMAN OF KNESSET COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TOLD US TODAY THAT MRS MEIR'S REFERENCE TO BRUTAL SOVIET THREATS (SEE ABOVE) DID NOT MEAN THAT GOI HAD RECEIVED ANY SOVIET MESSAGES THROUGH THIRD PARTIES. ADDRESSED DIRECTLY TO ISRAEL.

5. OUR ESTIMATE OF ATTITUDE OF LABOR LEADERSHIP YESTERDAY AND TODAY, BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH ZADOK AND SOME NONE-OFFICIAL OBSERVERS, IS AS FOLLOWS.

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
6. BEFORE LAST EVENING'S MEETING, THERE HAD BEEN UNDERCURRENT OF DISSATISFACTION OVER FACT THAT US DID NOT CONSULT GOI IN ADVANCE OVER TERMS OF UNSC RES 338. THERE ALSO HAD BEEN SOME CONCERN OVER RAPID CABINET DECISION TO ACCEPT RES, WHICH HAD INVOLVED ALMOST NO ISRAELI POLITICAL CONSULTATION.

7. MRS MEIR AND DAYAN CARRIED THE DAY WITH THEIR PRESENTATIONS. IT IS CLEAR THAT MRS MEIR PERSONALLY TRUSTS PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY. LABOR LEADERSHIP SHARES THIS TRUST. IT IS NOW ACCEPTED THAT BOTH US INITIATIVE AND GOI ACCEPTANCE OF IT WERE SOUND. THERE LINGERS AT THE SAME TIME HOPE THAT ISRAEL DID NOT CREATE UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT IN US-ISRAELI RELATIONS BY RAPIDLY ACCEPTING RES 338 AS FAIT ACCOMPLI.

8. BASED ON INFO AVAILABLE TO US, IT APPEARS THAT FOLLOWING EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS OF YESTERDAY, LABOR ALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP WIDELY SUPPORTS GOI POSITION IN HAVING FOLLOWED US LEAD IN VARIOUS INITIATIVE TAKEN SO FAR, IN AND OUTSIDE UN CONTEXT, TO STOP WAR. FURTHERMORE, LEADERSHIP IS WILLING TO GRANT POSSIBILITY THAT NOW, SOMEWHERE, US WILL BE ABLE TO ORGANIZE MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATING PROCESS. AT SAME TIME, THERE IS CERTAINLY NO MOOD OF OPTIMISM THAT SOLUTION TO MID EAST CONFLICT MAY BE IN SIGHT.

9. COMMENT: AS I SEE SITUATION, ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT AT THIS MOMENT WHICH MIGHT MAKE OUR JOB OF LEADING ISRAEL INTO DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS EASIER TODAY THAN THIS MAY PROVE A FEW WEEKS FROM NOW.
KEATING

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WAR 26 Oct
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WA

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(5) 3

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

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R 261015Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4920
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

SECRET BEIRUT 12488

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS, PINS, XF, LE
SUBJECT: FEDAYEEN THREAT TO CEASEFIRE

REF: BEIRUT 12470 AND 12479

SUMMARY: WITH CEASEFIRE IN SYRIA AND EGYPT AND UN ASSISTANCE TO ENSURE IT HOLDS, PROBLEM OF PREVENTING FEDAYEEN FROM DISRUPTING CEASEFIRE AND ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS BECOMES MUCH MORE IMPORTANT. GOL TAKING VIGOROUS ACTION MEET CHALLENGE OUTSIDE SUPPORT. LEADERS OF LARGER FEDAYEEN GROUPS APPEAR TO HAVE TEMPORARILY BOWED TO PRESSURE FROM ARAB GOVTS AND SAY THEY WILL COOPERATE WITH GOL ON CEASEFIRE. HOWEVER, SMALLER, RADICAL GROUPS APPEAR LESS COOPERATIVE. SABOTAGE OPERATION INSIDE ISRAEL, TERRORISM, AND SOME MINOR CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS LIKELY CONTINUE, DESPITE CEASEFIRE. ATTITUDE OF USSR RAISE THIS QUESTION WITH SOVS. END SUMMARY.


1. AS REPORTED REFTEL, GOL AWARE OF ITS ADDED RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CONTROLLING FEDAYEEN IN SOUTHERN LEBANON IF SC RESOLUTION 338 TO BE IMPLEMENTED. GOVT AWARE THAT ITS MILITARY WEAKNESS AND OPEN SOCIETY MAKE LEBANON CENTER OF FEDAYEEN OPPOSITION. GOL ALSO AWARE

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
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V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 BEIRUT 12488 261235Z

THAT INFILTRATION OR FIRING FROM LEBANON ASSUMES MUCH GREATER SIGNIFICANCE IN ISRAELI EYES WHEN THERE IS NO MILITARY ACTION ELSEWHERE, AND THEREFORE MUCH MORE LIKELY PROVOKE RETALIATION. GOLDA MEIR'S WARNING IN KNESSET ADDRESS RECEIVED HERE LOUD AND CLEAR.

2. EVENTS OF LAST MAY CLEARLY REVEALED LIMITATIONS ON GOL'S ABILITY IMPOSE FIRM CONTROL ON ALL FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES. NEITHER BLANCE OF MILITARY FORCE NOR INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION HAS EVOLVED IN GOL FAVOR SINCE THEN. THEREFORE GOL WILL REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE OUTSIDE SUPPORT IF IT IS TO IMPOSE AND MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE ON FEDAYEEN.

3. MOST IMPORTANT FEDAYEEN GROUPS IN LEBANON ARE SA'IGA (PLUS SOME PLA) WHICH RESPONSIVE TO DAMASCUS, AND FATAH WHICH IS INDEPENDENT BUT CAN BE INFLUENCED BY SYRIA, EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT. SYRIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES IN LEBANON IS MOST IMPORTANT SINGLE OUTSIDE FACTOR AS SEEN IN EVENTS OF LAST MAY. GOL HAS THEREFORE BEEN IN ALMOST DAILY CONTACT WITH SARG ON THIS QUESTION AND IS RECEIVING STEADY STREAM OF ASSURANCES OF FULL COOPERATION, INCLUDING PROMISES MADE BY PRESIDENT ASSAD TO PRIME MINISTER SOLH IN DAMASCUS OCT 21 AND MORE RECENT PROMISES MADE BY PHONE. RECENT SYRIAN ASSURANCES SEEM BE GENUINE JUDING BY LIMITED FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY OCT 24 AND 25, ALTHOUGH GOL FEARS SARG COULD EASILY CHANGE POLICY SHOULD INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION CHANGE. GOL ALSO MAINTAINING CONTACT WITH SAUDIS AND KUWAIT IN HOPES OF GETTING HELP WITH FATAH. DESPITE APPARENT COOPERATION OF MAJOR FEDAYEEN LEADERS WITH CEASEFIRE, GOL KNOWS THAT IT MUST EXPECT TROUBLE ALONG BORDER FROM EXTREMIST FATAH MEMBERS AS WELL AS FROM PFLP AND PDPLP. AMRY BELIEVES IT CAN DEAL WITH MOST OF THESE THREATS SO LONG AS MAJOR FEDAYEEN ELEMENTS STAY OUT.

4. ATTITUDE OF USSR TOWARD FEDAYEEN IN LEBANON IS NATYRALLY VERY IMPORTANT. WE HOPE THAT CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE DISPLAYED BY SOVS IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON RES 338 SUBSEQUENT RESES WILL ALSO APPLY TO FEDAYEEN

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PROBLEM. IF USSR WILLING THROW ITS WEIGHT BEHIND EFFORTS RESTRAIN FEDAYEEN, BOTH IN ITS DIRECT CONTACTS WITH THEM AND IN ITS CONTACTS WITH OTHER ARAB GOVTS, CHANCES OF IMPOSING CEASEFIRE ON FEDAYEEN WILL BE MUCH IMPROVED.

5. IN ADDITION TO DIFFICULTY OF IMPOSING CEASEFIRE ON FEDAYEEN, THERE WILL ALSO BE PROBLEM OF CONTINUING SABOTAGE ACTIVITY INSIDE ISRAELI-CONTROLLED TERRITORY AND CONTINUING TERRORISM. IT EVEN POSSIBLE THAT TERRORISTS WOULD STRIKE INCREASINGLY AT ARAB TARGETS, ESPECIALLY IN COUNTRIES BELIEVED READY TO "SELL OUT" PALESTINIAN CAUSE. THIS COULD RESEMBLE PATTERN OF PAST FEDAYEEN ACTIONS VIS. JORDAN, AND TERRORISTS WOULD LIKELY BE SUPPORTED BY EXYREMIST ARAB GOVTS UNHAPPY WITH SC RES 338, (E.G., IRAQ, LIBYA AND PERHAPS ALGERIA). NEED TO GENERATE ARAB AND SOVIET PRESSURES TO DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS IS CLEAR, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT REASLISTICALLY THIS SHOULD BE TACKLED AT LATER STAGE, CONCENTRATING PRESENT EFFORTS ON EASIER PROBLEM OF IMPOSING CEASEFIRE.
BUFFUM

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WAR
TELEGRAM
26 Oct

SECRET 682

PAGE 01 PARIS 27845 261929Z

51
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSD-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

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P 261745Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4370

SECRET PARIS 27845

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MASS, FR, IS
SUBJECT: FRENCH MILITARY SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL

NOFORN

1. THE HEAD OF THE ISRAELI MILITARY PURCHASING MISSION IN PARIS (PLEASE PROTECT FULLY) TOLD EMBOFF OCTOBER 25 THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE EXTREMELY SURPRISED AND PLEASED AT THE AMOUNT AND KIND OF EQUIPMENT WHICH THEY WERE ABLE TO GET OUT OF FRANCE AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE HOSTILITIES. GIVEN GOF DECLARED POLICY, THEY HAD EXPECTED A TOTAL EMBARGO, BUT THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. SPARE PARTS IN PARTICULAR WERE SURPRISINGLY EASY TO GET OUT.

2. ACCORDING TO THE ISRAELI SOURCE, THE FRENCH ATTITUDE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CONDITIONED BY THAT OF THE US. HE ADDED THAT THERE WAS A HUGE SIGH OF RELIEF IN FRENCH MILITARY SUPPLY CIRCLES WHEN THE AMERICAN ARMS SHIPMENTS BEGAN. THINGS BECAME EASIER WITH THE BEGINNING OF THE AMERICAN RE-SUPPLY EFFORT, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE THE FRENCH EFFORT WOULD BE LESS LIKELY TO ATTRACT ATTENTION ONCE AMERICAN SHIPMENTS BEGAN.
IRWIN

03

HS

A/B

(5)

ANDERSON
HOLDRIDGE
HORMATS
JORDEN
KENNEDY
LEHMAN
LEVINE
NEGROPONTE
ODEEN
RATLIFF
ROSEN
SILVERMASTER
TAMM
TROTTER
W. H. G.
WALSH



Department of State

War
TELEGRAM

26 Oct

SECRET 683

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51
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

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R 261025Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4116
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T CAIRO 3243

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: MOPS EG IS

SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEW ON CAUSES AND TIMING OF EGYPTIAN
DECISION TO RESUME HOSTILITIES

1. DEPUTY TASS DIRECTOR LEO YEDRASHNIKOV, A SUSPECTED RIS
OFFICER, HAS TOLD US THAT SADAT MADE DECISION TO OPEN
HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL IN EARLY AUGUST. YEDRASHNIKOV
SAID SOVIETS HAD VERY CAREFULLY CHECKED THEIR OWN RECORDS
TO DETERMINE ACTUAL DATE OF DECISION. HE SAID THAT SOVIET
EMBASSY IN CAIRO HAD RECEIVED SOME INDICATIONS IN AUGUST
AND SEPTEMBER THAT SADAT WAS PREPARING FOR ANOTHER FIGHT,
BUT WERE NOT ABLE TO DRAW THESE TOGETHER INTO
COHERENT PICTURE UNTIL THE END OF SEPTEMBER. MOREOVER,
SOVIET EMBASSY HAD NOT BELIEVED THAT RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING
WAS AT ALL LIKELY.

2. YEDRASHNIKOV SAID THAT, USING 20/20 HINDSIGHT, SOVIETS
HAD PUT TOGETHER PICTURE OF WHO HAD BEEN INFORMED OF GOE
DECISION TO RESUME WARFARE. HE STATED THAT FEISAL WAS

ANDERSON
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HORMATS
JORDEN
KENNEDY
LEHMAN
LEVINE
NEGROPONTE
ODEEN
RATLIF
RONDON
SAMUELS
SONNENFELD
V.I.G.
WALSH

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Department of State

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INFORMED OF PLAN RELATIVELY EARLY IN THE GAME. SADAT HAD DISCUSSED PLAN WITH HIM DURING HIS VISIT TO JIDDA ON AUGUST 23, AND HAD IN FACT BEEN ENCOURAGED BY SAUDI MONARCH. HUSSEIN WAS GENERALLY AWARE THAT EGYPT WAS PREPARING FOR WAR, BUT WAS NOT INFORMED OF WHEN IT WOULD OCCUR. HE DISCUSSED DECISION WITH SADAT DURING TRIPARTITE MEETINGS IN CAIRO ON SEPTEMBER 10-12 AND WAS ENJOINED TO SILENCE. HVEDRASHNIKOV SAID THAT HUSSEIN WAS TAKEN BY SURPRISE ON DAY WAR BROKE OUT, SINCE HE BELIEVED IT WOULD TAKE PLACE LATER.

3. WITHIN THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, SECRET WAS HELD VERY TIGHTLY AMONG SMALL GROUP OF ADVISORS SURROUNDING SADAT. THESE WERE WAR MINISTER AHMED ISMAIL, INTERIOR MINISTER SALEM AND ASU FIRST SECRETARY HAFEZ GHANEM. HEYKAL WAS BROUGHT INTO IT AFTER HE RETURNED TO SADAT'S GRACES AT THE END OF AUGUST. YEDRASHNIKOV SAID THAT HAFEZ ISMAIL WAS OPPOSED TO WAR FROM START; HE WAS STRONGLY PRO-AMERICAN AND BELIEVED THAT POLICY OF RAPPROCHEMENT WITH WEST WAS WORKING IN EGYPT'S FAVOR.

4. ON OCTOBER 5, SADAT HELD FULL CABINET MEETING TO REVEAL THAT ON FOLLOWING DAY EGYPT WOULD GO TO WAR. DURING DISCUSSION WHICH TOOK PLACE, MOST OF THOSE PRESENT APPROVED. VICE-PRESIDENT SHAFET AND HAFEZ ISMAIL WERE OPPOSED. VICE-PRESIDENT FAWZI CONTRIBUTED LITTLE TO THE DISCUSSION.

5. YEDRASHNIKOV CONCLUDED THAT SOVIETS THEMSELVES WERE NOT AWARE OF DANGER OF SITUATION UNTIL END OF SEPTEMBER, AND DID NOT KNOW DEFINITELY THAT SADAT WAS ABOUT TO RESUME WAR UNTIL OCTOBER 3, WHEN VINOGRADOV SAW SADAT.

6. REGARDING CAUSES OF WAR, YEDRASHNIKOV SAID SOVIETS BELIEVED IT TO HAVE BEEN FORCED ON SADAT BY INTERNAL PRESSURES. AMONG THESE WERE WIDESPREAD RESENTMENT AT SHORTAGES AND PRICE INCREASES OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS, FEARS IN GOE OF CONTINUED STUDENT DISTURBANCES WHEN UNIVERSITIES, AND GENERAL MALAISE ABOUT POLITICAL SITUATION. YEDRASHNIKOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THESE REASONS SEEMED INSUBSTANTIAL ALMOST TO THE POINT OF WHIMSY, BUT ADDED THERE SEEMED NO OTHER PROXIMATE CAUSE.

SMITH

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TELEGRAM

War

file

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TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
BT
SECRET STATE 211737

NODIS

E.O. 11652:GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, FR
SUBJECT: KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET CALL ON SECRETARY

1. ON OCTOBER 25 AMBASSADOR KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET CALLED AT HIS REQUEST, ON INSTRUCTIONS, ON SECRETARY KISSINGER. ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SPRINGSTEEN AND DEJAMMET OF FRENCH EMBASSY ALSO PRESENT.
2. THE AMBASSADOR SAID FOREIGN MINISTER JOBERT HAD ASKED HIM TO SEE THE SECRETARY TO DISCUSS THREE POINTS: THE PAST, THE PRESENT, AND THE FUTURE WITH REGARD TO THE MIDDLE EAST. HE PROPOSED TO DISCUSS THE "PRESENT" AND THE "FUTURE" WITH OTHER PARTICIPANTS PRESENT BUT ASKED FOR A PRIVATE TALK ON THE "PAST".
3. WITH REGARD TO THE "PRESENT" HE SAID WE NOW HAVE A SITUATION WITH A CEASEFIRE AND A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION BUT THE QUESTION IS HOW DO YOU IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTION AND HOW TO DEAL WITH THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE CEASEFIRE-
4. WITH REGARD TO THE "FUTURE", HE SAID THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WAS AMBIGUOUS AND SETTLED NOTHING. HE NOTED THAT IT SPOKE OF THE "APPROPRIATE FRAME" FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND ASKED WHAT WE ENVISAGED. HE ALSO ASKED WHAT HELP FNCE COULD BE AND WHAT WOULD BE THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
5. CONTINUING, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT BASICALLY FRANCE AGREES WITH THE UNITED STATES ON ONE POINT: THEY DO NOT WISH TO SEE THE SOVIETS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

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6. THE SECRETARY REVIEWED DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST DAY POINTING OUT THAT WE HAD HAD INFORMATION THAT SEVEN OUT OF THE EIGHT SOVIET AIR-BORNE DIVISIONS HAD BEEN MOBILIZED RECENTLY. THEN LAST NIGHT WE HAD RECEIVED A LETTER FROM BREZHNEV DEMANDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A US-SOVIET FORCE IN THE MIDDLE ST AND INDICATING THAT IF WE DID NOT AGREE THE SOVIETS WOULD PROCEED UNILATERALLY TO PLACE THEIR FORCES THERE. BEFORE RESPONDING TO THIS LETTER, AND IN ORDER TO SHOW THAT WE WERE SERIOUS, WE WENT ON A MILITARY ALERT. WE THEN ANSWERED BRESHNEV'S LETTER.

7. THE SECRETARY ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO INFORM JOBERT THAT, IN RESPONDING TO THE LETTER, WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT IF THEY PUT IN FORCES UNILATERALLY INTO THE MIDDLE EAST THEY WOULD BE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE II OF THE AGREEMENT ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR.

8. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IT MIGHT BE EASIER TO GET A GLOBAL SETTLEMENT THAN A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. HE STATED THAT BECAUSE OF THE WAR OF 1967 THE ISRAELIS HAD MANAGED TO INTRODUCE THE SOVIETS INTO THE AREA. NOW MAYBE FRANCE COULD HELP.

9. STATING THAT HE WISHED TO BE VERY HONEST WITH THE AMBASSADOR, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT WE PREPARED TO WORK WITH HIS GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, THE AMBASSADOR SHOULD BE AWARE THAT THE SECRETARY RECENTLY ORDERED A COMPLETE REEVALUATION OF OUR RELATIONS WITH EUROPE. EUROPE, HE SAID, INSISTS ON UNITY IN MATTERS REGARDING EUROPEAN DEFENSE BUT REFUSES TO COOPERATE ON OTHER ISSUES. HE FELT THAT THERE HAD TO BE AN END TO THIS KIND OF CONDUCT. HE STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT SAYING THIS AGAINST THE FRENCH BECAUSE HE KNEW WHERE FRANCE STOOD AND IF YOU SAY THAT FRANCE CAN HELP IN THE MIDDLE EAST, HE, THE SECRETARY, WOULD RESPOND AFFIRMATIVELY IF WE HAVE AGREED POSITIONS.

10. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT IN THE PAST FRANCE HAD HAD A DIFFERENT CONCEPTION, NOT ON AIMS, BUT ON TACTICS AND INDICATED THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR FRANCE TO FOLLOW THE UNITED STATES WITH "CLOSED EYES."

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11. IN RESPONSE THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT WE DO NOT EXPECT FRANCE TO FOLLOW US ON ALL ISSUES OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM. HOWEVER, THE PRIMARY ISSUE IN THE CURRENT CRISIS HAS BEEN THE CONDUCT OF THE SOVIETS. THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM HAS BEEN SECONDARY. THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS THE EUROPEANS FAILED TO SEE THIS.

hard to separate for Eur

12. KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF WHAT HE CALLED THE LACK OF CONSULTATION DURING THE CRISIS. HE NOTED FOR INSTANCE THAT HE HAD NO BACKGROUND WHEN HE WAS INFORMED OF THE ALERT THIS MORNING AND HE HAD BEEN GIVEN NO ADVANCE WARNING ON THE RESOLUTION WE WISHED TO INTRODUCE INTO THE SECURITY COUNCIL TODAY. HE HAD TO CALL JOBERT ABOUT THE RESOLUTION AND IF HE HAD HAD SOME BACKGROUND, IT WOULD HAVE HELPED.

13. THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT THE CRISIS CAME ON US VERY UNEXPECTEDLY WHEN WE RECEIVED THE BREZHNEV LETTER LAST NIGHT. THAT LETTER WAS A TOTALLY SHOCKING THING. TO TELL US THAT WE HAD TO GO INTO THE MIDDLE EAST TOGETHER WAS AN ABSURDITY WHICH WOULD HAVE HAD REPERCUSSIONS THROUGHOUT EUROPE AND EVEN INTO CHINA. AS A RESULT WE HAD TO SPEND MOST OF THE NIGHT POSITIONING OUR FORCES. HE NOTED THAT, IN ALL CANDOR, PERHAPS WE SHOULD HAVE TOLD YOU BUT HE SAID THAT OUR EXPERIENCE IN THIS CRISIS WITH THE EUROPEANS IS THEY HAVE BEHAVED NOT AS FRIENDS BUT AS HOSTILE POWERS. NOT ONCE DID WE GET THEIR SUPPORT.

pretty sharp

14. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE NOW UNDERSTOOD, IN LIGHT OF WHAT THE SECRETARY SAID, THE RUMSFELD INTERVENTION IN NATO WHICH HE AND HIS GOVERNMENT HAD CONSIDERED AS BEING VERY ABRUPT.

15. THE SECRETARY GAVE THE BACKGROUND ON AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD'S INTERVENTION NOTING THAT WE HAD FOUND LUNS AND OTHERS SAYING THAT THE US HAD BEEN TAKEN IN BY THE SOVIETS ON DETENTE AND WE ARE NOW PAYING THE PRICE FOR DETENTE. CONSIDERING THAT OTHERS HAD TREATIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION, THEY TOO SHOULD HAVE BEEN INVOLVED. MOREOVER, IF THE ALLIES FELT THAT DETENTE WAS OVER THERE ARE COMMON STEPS WE SHOULD TAKE TOGETHER TO BRING PRESSURE

TO BEAR ON THE SOVIETS. FINALLY, WE WISHED TO STRESS THAT THE INTERVENTION OF THE SOVIETS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTERESTS OF EUROPE.

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Department of State

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16. THE AMBASSADOR AGREED BUT NOTED THAT WHEN SOMEONE COMES BEFORE THE NAC WITHOUT PRIOR PREPARATION AND SAYS WHAT MR. RUMSFELD DID, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO AGREE WITH HIM. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT WHEN THE ALLIANCE ITSELF IS IN JEOPARDY, AS IT WAS AT THE TIME OF CUBAN CRISIS, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WENT ALONG.

17. THE SECRETARY REITERATED THAT THERE WERE TWO ISSUES IN THIS CRISIS. FIRST, THERE WAS THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE AND WE DID NOT FEEL THAT FRANCE WAS OBLIGED TO FOLLOW US ON THIS. BUT WE FELT THAT THIS BECAME A SECONDARY ISSUE WHEN THE SOVIETS ACTED BECAUSE IF THE SOVIETS WERE THERE IT WOULD HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE MODERATE FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS NOW STOPPED. NOW WE MUST ALL BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT SO THAT WE CAN REMOVE THIS DANGER.

18. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CONCURRED AND SAID THAT THEY ALWAYS HAD THIS OBJECTIVE.

19. WITH REGARD TO THE FUTURE THE AMBASSADOR ASKED WHAT HAPPENS NOW. WHAT IS THE TIMETABLE? HE NOTED THAT SADAT HAD SAID BREZHNEV HAD PROMISED HIM THAT ALL ISRAELI FORCES WOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES WHI GOLDA MEIR HAD STATED THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD MADE A CONTRARY PROMISE TO HER.

20. THE SECRETARY ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE HAD NOT MADE PROMISES WE CANNOT KEEP AND THAT THERE WERE NO SECRET UNDERSTANDINGS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROBLEM.

21. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WAS CONVINCED IN LIGHT OF THE PAST THAT THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS BY THEMSELVES WILL NEVER COME TO AN AGREEMENT. THE SECRETARY AGREED AND SAID HE WOULD GLADLY GIVE THE AMBASSADOR THE JOB OF GETTING THEM TOGETHER.

22. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID WE SHOULD NOT BELIEVE FRANCE IS UPSET BY OIL. THE FRENCH HAD ALWAYS HAD A CONCEPTION ABOUT A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST BUT THAT CONCEPTION WAS NOT GOVERNED BY OIL. HOWEVER, THEY DO HAVE A LARGE INTEREST IN OIL.

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TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

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23. THE SECRETARY SAID HE AGREED AND REFERRED TO GENERAL DE GAULLE'S POLICY ON THIS AREA. CONTINUING, HE SAID THAT WE WOULD BE GLAD IN PRINCIPLE TO EXCHANGE IDEAS WITH THE FRENCH BUT IF WE HAVE DISCUSSION WE SHOULD HAVE AGREEMENT ON THE POSITIONS THAT WE WILL PURSUE.

24. AMBASSADOR KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET SAID THAT JOBERT APPRECIATED THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE SENT FROM MOSCOW AND HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO COME IN AND GET A MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY.

25. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD HOPED TO DO THIS EARLIER BUT HE HAD BEEN IN ALMOST PERPETUAL CRISIS SINCE HIS RETURN FROM MOSCOW AND TEL AVIV. HE THEN SUGGESTED THAT HE AND THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR MEET IN PRIVATE.
KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: EUR:GSSPRINGSTEEN

APPROVED BY: S:MR.EAGLEBURGER

CLEARANCE: S/S:MR.GAMMON

SECRET

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Painters war

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MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report # 65

10/26/73

We have received from the Israeli Embassy in Washington reports of the following cease-fire violations: (1) Shooting started on our forces at the Gate of Suez; (2) Egyptian infantry attacked our forces at the 152nd kilometer; (3) Our tanker Sirius was hit in the Yuval Straits; (4) The Third Army forces opened fire with tanks and machineguns north to Suez City. Our forces have casualties. We are returning fire and possibly will operate our air force.

Our latest reading on the disposition of Israeli forces west of the Canal comes from an Israeli Defense Ministry source who reports the IDF to be in control of an enclave reaching along a line from Ras al-Adabiyah to Jabal Ataga and continuing northwest to the sweet water canal just south of the Cairo-Ismailia road--which is not cut by IDF forces--and thence eastward to Lake Timsah. The enclave envelopes Suez at its outskirts, but the city has not been occupied. Israeli forces reached Ras al-Adabiyah and occupied Jabal Ataga between the first and second cease-fires, their sole objective being to cut off the coastal road from the south leading north to Suez City. The same source also reports that Israeli forces are under orders to implement a complete blockade of the Egyptian Third Army on the east bank of the Canal, and that the IDF now controls three former Egyptian airfields, one of which (Fayid) is still operational; it has been renamed "Nakshon."

SECRET/EXDIS
GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

SECRET/EXDIS

-2-

Soviet deliveries began are in the rear along with 200 tanks earmarked for Iraqi forces in Syria, who the Israelis believe now number 30 to 40,000 men ordered by Baghdad to keep fighting at a time when the Syrian Government is trying to decide whether or not to continue the war. The Israelis tell us that their posture towards Syria at this point is "if they don't shoot, we don't shoot."

UNTSO/UNEF

SYG Waldheim told the Security Council on October 25 that he had directed an immediate build up of the UNTSO by over 900 soldiers now serving in Cyprus under UN colors. These are some 338 Austrians, 289 Finns, and 283 Swedes. Although the Russians have grumbled that these are all Western, the move appears to satisfy all parties; the British have agreed to provide lift, and the UNSYG will speak to Turkish, Greek and Cypriot representatives to urge them to keep the peace in Cyprus during this temporary UN draw-down on the island.

UNSYG is expected to keep his October 26 report to the SC general, focussing on the establishment, the mandate, and the financing of this new Middle East Force and steering clear of questions of composition, which loom large in view of reported Israeli opposition to countries with which it has no diplomatic relations and Egyptian opposition to countries which have ties with Israel. Cairo reportedly has rejected Rumanian and Canadian participation on this latter ground (the Canadians had offered 900 men.) Other offers include Panama (200), Ireland (9), and East Germany (50).

We have alerted all Embassies of the possibility of short-notice requests for landings and/or overflights in connection with our logistic support of the insertion of a new UNEF into the Middle East and have queried selected Embassies on likely participation of host governments in such a UNEF.

Defense has levied a request for 70 field-grade U.S. officers for 90 days TDY in the Middle East. Defense assures us, moreover, that it expects to be able to accomplish an airlift, from selected European sites, of

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-3-

the requisite number of troops (i.e., 7,000) within a four-day period without degrading our resupply capability vis-a-vis Israel.

Defense has assigned the nickname "Night Reach" to UN Peacekeeping airlift operations.

Soviet Activity

An all-time high of 85 Soviet naval units are now in the Mediterranean.

The Soviet airlift continued through October 25 with possibly six planes unloading military supplies at Cairo. To date the Soviets have made 832 airlift flights and delivered an estimated 12 thousand tons of military equipment to Egypt and Syria. (N.B. The Israeli Air Force says it has now captured every type of weapon system being used by the Arabs, including the SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7, T-62 Tank, AT-1 Snapper, AT-3 Swagger, and various AAA weapons.)

Ambassador Scali has registered to UN SYG Waldheim our strong objections to the bald attempt made by 70 Soviets who had just arrived in Cairo to be integrated into UNTSO. He pointed out that they were uninvited and their large number was clearly out of line in proportion to the total UNTSO force. Waldheim agreed and said he had told Malik it was impossible to integrate Soviets into UNTSO without appropriate SC actions.

Soviet reporting of the Secretary's October 25 press conference has stressed the U.S. intention to act in the spirit of the agreement achieved in Moscow, although it opposed the idea of sending American and Soviet troops to the Middle East. Significantly, monitored Voice of Moscow and Tass transmissions have not yet made mention of or commented on the U.S. military alert. References to the alert have been excised from their accounts of the Secretary's comments.

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-4-


U.S. Military Alert

Selective reduction of the alert status of
U.S. forces has begun.

APPROVED BY: *[Signature]*

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET/EXDIS



Department of State

WAR
TELEGRAM

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CONFIDENTIAL 71.

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3

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

USSS-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00 /031 W

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V. I. G. _____
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 513

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 4219

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR UN XF

SUBJ: UNEF: ISRAELI AIMS

1. AT MY INVITATION, AMB TEKDAH CALLED ON ME AFTER SC SESSION OCT 25 AND GAVE US PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OF UNEF. TEKDAH INSISTED HE UNINSTRUCTED, BUT EXPECTED TO RECEIVE MOMENTARILY SPECIFIC GUIDANCE.

2. TEKDAH SAID MOST FUNDAMENTAL AND ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT WAS THAT UNEF BE OBSERVATION FORCE ONLY, UNARMED, WITH NO MILITARY FUNCTIONS. HE CITED UN DOCUMENT A/3302 OF 6 NOV 1956 AS PRECEDENT, NOTING THAT HAMMARSKJOLD HAD DESCRIBED CONGO FORCE AS "NOT IN ANY WAY A MILITARY FORCE." UNEF PERSONNEL SHOULD CARRY SIDE ARMS AT MOST, AND HAVE CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS THESE COULD NOT BE FIRED EXCEPT IN RESPONSE TO BEING FIRED UPON. HE ADDED THAT EGYPTIAN AMB MEGUID SEEMED TO AGREE WITH THIS POSITION.

3. PURPOSE OF UNEF SHOULD BE TO ASSIST PARTIES, NOT TO "STAND ABOVE" THEM. POSITIONING OF UNEF ELEMENTS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES. UNEF SHOULD HAVE NO POWER TO FIX CEASEFIRE LINES. (IT WAS NOT CLEAR JUST HOW RECOGNIZED CEASEFIRE LINES WOULD IN FACT BE ESTABLISHED.) COMPOSITION OF UNEF WOULD HAVE TO BE DETERMINED BY AGREEMENT NOT JUST CONSULTATION

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CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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WITH THE PARTIES. HE ASKED NOT TO BE QUOTED ON OBSERVATION THAT, FOR POLITICAL REASONS, MRS. MEIR WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY NOT AGREE TO REC ON ISRAELI SIDE NATIONALS OF ANY STATE LACKING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. ON ONE POINT ONLY DID TEKOAH FAIL TO INSIST ON PREROGATIVES OF PARTIES: IT SHOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO REMOVE UNEF ON THE INITIATIVE OF A PARTY, BUT ONLY WITH SC AGREEMENT.


4. ASKED TO SUGGEST NON-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THAT MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL, TEKOAH WAS VERY RELUCTANT TO SPECULATE. HE MENTIONED THAILAND AS ONE ASIAN COUNTRY THAT MIGHT POSSIBLY BE ACCEPTABLE. HE THOUGHT MALAYSIA AND INDONESIA NOT ACCEPTABLE AT ALL. WE REMINDED HIM THAT INDONESIANS HAD EXPERIENCE AT PEACEKEEPING, HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN ELIMINATING CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL FROM RES 340, AND NOT BLINDLY PARTISAN. WE SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO ISRAEL TO ACCEPT UNEF ELEMENTS FROM WORLD'S LARGEST MUSLIM STATE. TEKOAH DEPRECATED THIS IDEA.

5. REGARDING SYG'S INITIAL STEPS PURSUANT TO RES 340, WE INFORMED TEKOAH THAT SYG, HAVING BEEN AUTHORIZED BY SC TO SEND SWEDISH, FINNISH AND AUSTRIAN "BATTALIONS" FROM CYPRUS TO EGYPT, WAS MOVING FORTHWITH TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. I ALSO INFORMED HIM THAT WALDHEIM PLANNED, BY WAY OF "REPORT OF STEPS TAKEN", TO GIVE UP ONLY BORAD INITIAL INSTALLMENT TOMORROW WITH FURTHER DETAILS TO BE PRESENTED THROUGH CONSULTATION PROCESS. TEKOAH WAS PLEASED BY THIS. TEKOAH, WHO HAD ALSO SPOKEN WITH SYG EARLIER IN AFTERNOON, SAID HE HAD TOLD WALDHEIM THAT TOMORROW'S STATEMENT SHOULD BE VAGUE AND NOT CONTROVERSIAL. HE HAD SUGGESTED THAT IN DEFINING MANDATE SYG USE SUCH PHRASE AS "TO ASSIST PARTIES IN OBSERVANCE OF CEASEFIRE." TEKOAH NOTED THAT IN STATEMENTS TODAY WALDHEIM HAD REFERRED TO SENDING PEOPLE "TO EGYPT" AND THAT HE SAW NO DIFFICULTY WITH USING THIS PHRASE TO MAKE CLEAR THEY NOT THERE TO FIX CEASEFIRE LINE.

6. I ALSO INFORMED TEKOAH OF SYG'S INFO THAT 70 SOV NATIONALS HAD TURNED UP UNINVITED IN CAIRO AND ANNOUNCED THEMSELVES AS RE-INFORCEMENTS FOR UNTSO. I TOLD TEKOAH THAT REPRESENTED A HELL OF A LOT OF SOVIETS WHO UNINVITED

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Department of State


TELEGRAM

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BY ANYONE. I TOLD HIM WALDHEIM HAD PROMISED HE
WOULD MAKE NO MOVE TO ACCEPT SINGLE ONE WITHOUT
SC APPROVAL AND PRIOR CONSULTATIONS WITH US.
I SAID WALDHEIM SEEMED TO BE RESPONDING REALISTICALLY
TO THIS DEVELOPMENT AND WARNED HIM NOT BE PRESSURED
BY SOVS.

7. WHOLE CONVERSATION WAS MOST FRIENDLY AND
TEKDAH DEPARTED IN EXCELLENT MOOD, SAYING HE WOULD
BE IN FURTHER CLOSE TOUCH ONCE HE RECD FURTHER EXPECTED
INSTRUCTIONS.
SCALI



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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WAR

26 Oct

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CCO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00 NSAE-00

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FM USMISSION USUN NEWYORK
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C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 4217

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UN, XF
SUBJ: DISCUSSIONS WITH SYG ON UNTSO AND UNEF

1. AT END OF SC MEETING THIS AFTERNOON I DISCUSSED
VARIOUS ASPECTS OF FUTURE ACTION IN THE REINFORCEMENT
OF UNTSO AND ESTABLISHMENT OF UNEF WITH SYG WALDHEIM.

2. I EXPRESSED IN STRONGEST TERMS OUR OBJECTION TO
FACT THAT 70 SOVIETS HAD LANDED IN CAIRO AND SOUGHT TO
BE INTEGRATED INTO UNTSO. I POINTED OUT THAT THEY WERE
UNINVITED AND THAT NUMBER WAS CLEARLY OUT OF LINE IN
PROPORTION TO TOTAL UNTSO FORCE. WALDHEIM AGREED AND
SAID HE HAD TOLD MALIK THAT HE COULD NOT INTEGRATE SOVIETS
INTO UNTSO WITHOUT APPROPRIATE ACTION OF SC. MALIK,
IN TURNABOUT OF TRADITIONAL SOVIET POSITION, SAID SYG HAD
AUTHORITY TO TAKE SUCH ACTION. WALDHEIM DISAGREED AND SAID
HE HAD ADVISED UNTSO IN CAIRO NOT TO TAKE ANY ACTION
WHATEVER IN INTEGRATING SOVS INTO UNTSO UNTIL AND UNLESS
HE GAVE WORD.

3. AFTER I EXPRESSED AMAZEMENT AT NUMBER OF
SOVS, WALDHEIM ASKED WHAT I WOULD THINK OF POSSIBLE BALANCE
OF US AND SOV PARTICIPATION IN UNTS. HE SUGGESTED 20
FROM EACH COUNTRY. I SAID I COULD GIVE NO PROMISES BUT
PERSONALLY THOUGHT LIMIT OF 15 MIGHT BE WORTH TALKING

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HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RUMSON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELDT _____
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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ABOUT. I SPECIFICALLY STRESSED THAT ANY SOV PARTICIPATION SHOULD INCLUDE INTERPRETERS AS EQUIVALENT TO SOLDIERS IN COUNT.

4. REGARDING UNEF, WALDHEIM EMPHASIZED HIS DESIRE THAT QUESTION OF COMPOSITION AND OTHER THORNY ISSUES BE SETTLED THROUGH QUIET DIPLOMACY BECAUSE HE DID NOT WANT COUNCIL TO BECOME SITE FOR PUBLIC WRANGLING. I AGREED AND SAID WE WOULD DO OUR UTMOST TO HELP SETTLE ISSUES BEHIND THE SCENES BEFORE COUNCIL TAKES ACTION.

5. TO THIS END, WALDHEIM PLANS TO PRESENT ONLY A GENERAL REPORT TOMORROW WITHOUT NAMING, FOR INSTANCE, POSSIBLE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS, ALTHOUGH HE HAS NUMEROUS OFFERS. PRESENT DRAFT OF WALDHEIM REPORT RE CONTRIBUTORS CONTAINS PHRASE THAT THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED IN CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTIES. URQUHART WHO ALSO PRESENT SAID THAT THIS COULD BE DIFFICULT SINCE THIS PROVISION NOT CONTAINED IN RES 340. SCHAUFELER POINTED OUT THAT RES 340 DOES NOT AUTHORIZE SYG TO SEND A FORCE TO THE ME AND THAT SC IN TAKING NECESSARY ACTION TO THIS END CLD INCLUDE THE PROVISION FOR CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTIES. WE ALL AGREED THAT THIS IS A CONSENT OPERATION REQUIRING CONSULTATION WITH PARTIES IF IT IS TO WORK.

6. WALDHEIM POINTED OUT THAT ONE OF MOST DIFFICULT ASPECTS WILL BE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION, PARTICULARLY FROM EASTERN EUROPE. AFTER NOTING THAT EAST GERMANS HAD OFFERED 50 OBSERVERS FOR UNTSO, HE SAID RUSSIANS SPEAKING PRIMARILY IN TERMS OF POLISH CONTINGENT. I POINTED OUT THAT ROMANIA SEEMED MORE LOGICAL SINCE IT RECOGNIZED BOTH PARTIES. WALDHEIM SAID EGYPTIANS HAD ALREADY TURNED DOWN ROMANIA BECAUSE IT RECOGNIZED ISRAEL. I REMINDED HIM THAT SUDAN, ARAB MEMBER OF SC, HAD SPECIFICALLY CALLED FOR ABSOLUTE NEUTRALITY OF FORCES AS WELL AS BALANCED GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION. IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IF EGYPTAINS ARE GOING TO TURN DOWN THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH RECOGNIZE ISRAEL AND ISRAELIS ARE GOING TO TURN DOWN THOSE COUNTRIES WHO DO NOT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL THAT WE HAVE ALREADY REACHED AN IMPASSE. BEST CRITERION WOULD BE THOSE COUNTRIES WHO RECOGNIZE BOTH.

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7. AGREEING IN PRINCIPLE TO THAT STATEMENT, WALDHEIM NOTED THAT EGYPTIANS HAD ALSO TURNED DOWN ONE OF MOST PROFESSIONAL PEACEKEEPING COUNTRIES - CANADA. HIS AIM HE SAID IS TO HAVE SEPARATE CONTINGENTS FROM AFRICA, LA, AND ASIA. HE ALSO NOTED THAT MALIK HAD ALREADY GRUMBLED THAT SWEDISH, FINNISH AND AUSTRIAN CONTINGENTS BEING TRANSFERRED FROM CYPRUS ARE ALL WESTERN COUNTRIES.

8. COMMENT: IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO KEEP LEANING FREQUENTLY ON WALDHEIM TO KEEP HIM FROM SUCCUMBING TO SOV AND OTHER PRESSURES. IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE WE HOPE THAT WE CAN ALSO PERSUADE NON-ALIGNED TO PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE BOTH WITH SYG AND SOVS. HOPEFUL

ASPECT IS THAT URQUHART IS VETERAN OF PEACEKEEPING PROBLEMS, UNDERSTANDS DIFFICULT PROBLEMS AHEAD AND ENCOURAGES TO BE FORCEFUL WITH WALDHEIM. SCALI

ADMINISTRATIVE

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SECRET/EXDIS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #66

10/26/73

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1200 EDT,

Cease-Fire

On the morning of October 26 the Egyptian Third Army attempted to break through surrounding Israeli forces, creating a new strain on the cease-fire. The IDF has announced that the Third Army is still attacking at 5 points along the Canal and is attempting to bridge the waterway from East to West. USDAO Tel Aviv reports that the Egyptian attack has been repulsed by the Israelis who were supported by Air Force units. IDF casualties were described as "not heavy." In the northern sector, the Second Army continues to observe the cease-fire.

The Lebanese front appears to have quieted down with the Lebanese Army and UNTSO reporting very few incidents of cross-border firing or other Fedayeen activity on the night of October 24 and throughout October 25. Following a policy meeting chaired by President Frangie, the Lebanese Army--in contrast to its recent inactivity--is now patrolling in the border area.

An Egyptian spokesman has disclaimed responsibility for a reported attack on the Israeli tanker Sirius; the Egyptians maintain the ship struck a mine and the Israelis have now accepted this explanation. Reports from Israel suggest that the ship will probably sink.

There have been no reports of military activity on the Golan front.

SECRET/EXDIS

GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

SECRET/EXDIS

2.

UNEF

In response to our queries about availability of troops and logistical support for the UNEF, the following has come in from various posts: Norway has a force of 1300 earmarked for UN peacekeeping; it clearly appears to be interested in making at least part of them available. Sweden has committed a battalion to UNEF out of its forces on Cyprus. Thailand seems to want an invitation to participate and probably could contribute one infantry battalion. Denmark is prepared to respond to a UN request with a force of about 1,000 men. Indonesia seems favorably disposed and could probably provide an 8-900 man battalion. The Netherlands will respond favorably; they have 1300 men earmarked. Embassy Vienna believes Austria would be ready to help. Composition of the force is currently under consideration in the UN.

Brezhnev on Middle East

Speaking before the "Congress of Peace Forces" in Moscow, General Secretary Brezhnev noted the Egyptian call for Soviet and American participation in policing the cease-fire, recalled Soviet willingness to satisfy Egypt's request and the fact that "we have already sent such representatives" and expressed the hope that the USG "will proceed in a similar way." In his address, Brezhnev also said the USSR is ready to cooperate with all interested countries in normalizing the situation in the Middle East. Cooperation, however, cannot be fostered by "actions like the artificial inflammation of passions by means of spreading fantastic rumors of different kinds about the intentions of the Soviet Union in the Middle East."

APPROVED BY: Roderick M. Wright

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET/EXDIS



THE JOINT STAFF

TOP SECRET

N M C C

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

War

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Recapitulation of Deliveries to Israel

Listed below are data covering US equipment deliveries to Israel as of 0730Z 26 October 1973:

| Totals for 24-Hour Periods Ending 0730Z on the Day Shown* | 20 Oct | 21 Oct | 22 Oct | 23 Oct |
|---|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|
| By Soviets | 1170-1500 | 1310-1656 | 790-984 | 860-1116 |
| By U.S. Mil | 829 | 895 | 1013 | 1024 |
| By El Al | 62 | 112 | 197 | 54 |
| | 24 Oct | 25 Oct | 26 Oct | |
| By Soviets | 380-528 | 20-40 | 340-480 | |
| By U.S. Mil | 985 | 816 | 867 | |
| By El Al | 176 | 15 | 212 | |
| Cumulative Totals* | 20 Oct | 21 Oct | 22 Oct | 23 Oct |
| By Soviets | 7320-9156 | 8530-10812 | 8950-11328 | 9810-12444 |
| By U.S. Mil | 3988 | 4883 | 5896 | 6920 |
| By U.S./El Al | 1550 | 1662 | 1859 | 1913 |
| | 24 Oct | 25 Oct | 26 Oct | |
| By Soviets | 10090-12852 | 10110-12876 | 10450-13356 | |
| By U.S. Mil | 7905 | 8721 | 9588 | |
| By U.S./El Al | 2089 | 2104 | 2316 | |

*Excluding aircraft delivered.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

U.S. Aircraft Delivered

| <u>No.</u> | <u>Type</u> | <u>Date Delivered</u> | <u>Remarks</u> |
|------------|-------------|-----------------------|--|
| 8 | F-4E | 14 Oct 73 | |
| 6 | F-4E | 15 Oct 73 | |
| 12 | C-130B | 15 Oct 73 | |
| 12 | F-4E | 17 Oct 73 | |
| 2 | F-4E | 18 Oct 73 | |
| 4 | F-4E | 20 Oct 73 | |
| 8 | A-4 | 21 Oct 73 | |
| 10 | A-4 | 22 Oct 73 | |
| 7 | F-4 | 22 Oct 73 | |
| 1 | F-4 | 23 Oct 73 | Completes programmed F-4 delivery. |
| 13 | A-4 | 23 Oct 73 | |
| 5 | A-4 | 24 Oct 73 | Completes programmed A-4 air deployment. Four A-4s in transit by ship. |

Sorties

| | <u>Last 24 Hours</u> | <u>Cumulative</u> |
|-------|----------------------|-------------------|
| C-141 | 15 | 185 |
| C-5 | 5 | 61 |
| E1 A1 | 6 | 63 |

F. T. Brown

F. T. BROWN
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for
Operations, NMCC

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WH (LDX)

DOD (LDX)

CIA (LDX)

NSA (LDX)

PA/HO

L

S/CCT

SCA

SY

SCI

SECRET/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
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SECRET/EXDIS
GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

SECRET/EXDIS

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APPROVED BY: Roderick M. Wright

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET/EXDIS

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DE RUEHC #2297 3000021
D 262326Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION FC BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0000
USMISSION OECD PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0000
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000

UNCLAS STATE 212297

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, US, EUR

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT OCTOBER 26 NEWS BRIEFING

EXCERPTS AMBASSADOR MCCLOSKEY'S BRIEFING FOLLOW:

"Q: BOB, IF I COULD SWITCH TO A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT TOPIC,
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC YESTERDAY PROTESTED US SUPPLIES --

DELIVERIES OF US SUPPLIES OUT OF GERMANY TO ISRAEL. AND
IN THE SAME CONTEXT, AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND WAS

DESCRIBED AS HAVING EXPRESSED REGRETS OVER A LACK OF
COMMUNICATIONS IN THIS CONTEXT. AND IN AT LEAST ONE MORN-
ING PAPER HERE IN WASHINGTON, THIS WAS DESCRIBED AS A
POSSIBLE MAJOR SOURCE OF FRICTION BETWEEN BONN AND
WASHINGTON. WOULD YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT ON THAT?

A: WELL, LET ME SAY THAT OUR VIEW IS THAT THE MAINTENANCE
OF THE MILITARY BALANCE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DURABLE
PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH IN OUR VIEW AND BY OUR
ACTION IS WHAT THE RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL IS ABOUT, IS JUST AS
MUCH IN THE VITAL INTERESTS OF WEST GERMANY AND OUR OTHER
NATO ALLIES AS IT IS IN OUR INTEREST AND THAT OF THE WORLD
AT LARGE.

LET ME ADD THAT WE REMAIN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE WEST
GERMANS ON THIS MATTER, AND I THINK YOU WILL NOTE THAT THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S AMBASSADOR IS COMING IN TO SEE THE
SECRETARY LATER TODAY. THAT IS AT HIS REQUEST.

Q: BOB, ON THE SAME SUBJECT, MR. SCHLESINGER THIS MORNING
SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD REFLECT (ON)
ITS ATTITUDE TOWARDS GERMANY ON THE ONE SIDE AND OTHER
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHO DIDN'T SUPPORT OR AT LEAST BEHAVED
IN A WAY WHICH DIDN'T SEEM QUITE SATISFACTORY. IS THAT
ALSO THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT?

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PAGE 01

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*****U N C L A S S I F I E D***** COPY

A: WELL, LET ME SAY THAT WE WERE AND HAVE BEEN IN A VERY CRITICAL PERIOD, A PERIOD WHICH AFFECTED IN MANY WAYS ALL OF US, OURSELVES AND OUR ALLIES IN WESTERN EUROPE. AND THAT WE WERE STRUCK BY A NUMBER OF OUR ALLIES GOING TO SOME LENGTHS TO IN EFFECT SEPARATE THEMSELVES PUBLICLY FROM US. AND IT RAISES THE QUESTION FOR US AS TO HOW THAT ACTION ON THEIR PART CAN BE SQUARED WITH WHAT THE EUROPEANS HAVE OFTEN REFERRED TO AS THE INDIVISIBILITY BETWEEN US ON MATTERS OF SECURITY.

Q: CAN I CARRY ON ON THIS. WERE THERE ANY CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EUROPEANS ON ALL THESE PROBLEMS, AND ESPECIALLY IN THE LAST THIRTY-SIX HOURS, WHEN THE QUESTION OF ALLIES CAME UP?

A: YES -- EMPHATICALLY, YES.

Q: CONSULTATION OR ADVICE?

A: EMPHATICALLY THERE WAS CONSULTATION IN THE NATO COUNCIL....

Q: BOB, DO WE HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT A FEAR OF A CUT-OFF OF OIL SUPPLIES WAS BEHIND THE EUROPEAN MOVE TO PUBLICLY DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH US?

A: IT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR WHAT ENTIRELY MAY HAVE BEEN THE REASONS AND THE MOTIVATIONS FOR THE ATTITUDES THAT A NUMBER OF THE EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TOOK, SOME OF WHICH WERE EXPRESSED PUBLICLY. WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF HOW AN OIL EMBARGO AFFECTS EUROPE. WE HAVE OFTEN REVIEWED WITH EUROPEAN NATIONS THE ISSUE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF AN OIL EMBARGO FROM THE AREA. WE ARE QUITE AWARE OF THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THAT. BUT HERE WE FOUND OURSELVES IN A SITUATION OF SOME TENSENESS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND WE COULD HAVE APPRECIATED A LITTLE MORE UNIFIED SUPPORT FOR THE ACTIONS THAT WE FELT WERE NECESSARY TO TAKE....

Q: BOB, HAS THE SECRETARY TAKEN UP THIS EXPRESSION OF SOME UNHAPPINESS WITH THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE WITH THE EUROPEANS DIRECTLY? HAS THIS BEEN TAKEN UP BY AMBASSADORS HERE, (OR) IN EUROPE? HOW HAS THIS BEEN EXPRESSED?

A: WELL, OVER THE PERIOD OF THE LAST FEW WEEKS, AND I WOULD SAY PARTICULARLY SINCE OCTOBER 6, IT HAS BEEN A TOPIC OF DISCUSSION IN A VARIETY OF MEETINGS, BOTH HERE AND ABOARD. SO THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE NO REASON TO BE UNAWARE OF THIS VIEW....

Q: BOB, WHAT WOULD THE UNITED STATES LIKE TO SEE THE WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DO NOW TO ASSIST OUR EFFORT IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

A: I WILL BE PREPARED TO SPEAK TO THAT ON ANOTHER DAY.

Q: BOB, IN THE SAME AREA, WERE THERE ANY OF OUR NATO ALLIES THAT GAVE US THE KIND OF SUPPORT WE WOULD HAVE APPRECIATED?

A: YES.

Q: COULD YOU TELL US WHO THEY WERE?

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A: THERE WAS ONE COUNTRY IN PARTICULAR, AND I DON'T WANT TO HAVE TO SAY PUBLICLY WHO THAT IS RIGHT NOW....

Q: BOB, THIS QUESTION -- THERE IS NO DEFINITE ANSWER, BUT I WOULD JUST LIKE TO RAISE IT WITH YOU -- THIS QUESTION OF THE INDIVISIBILITY OF SECURITY WITH REGARD TO ANYTHING WHICH THREATENS US, WHICH THREATENS SOMEONE ELSE -- COMES UP FROM TIME TO TIME. ONE TIME IN A SITUATION NOT ENTIRELY ANALOGOUS, BUT I CAN REMEMBER IN 1964, 1965, WHEN MR. MCNAMARA AND MR. RUSK WERE ELEVATING OUR COMMITMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA TO THE SAME LEVEL AS OUR COMMITMENT TO NATO ALMOST, AND WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THE INDIVISIBILITY OF SECURITY -- WELL, THIS IS A LOT CLOSER. BUT IS THERE EVER ANY WAY OF TRYING TO DETERMINE IN ADVANCE WHAT REQUIRES THE INDIVISIBILITY OF SECURITY, OR DO YOU JUST HAVE TO TAKE EACH ONE AND AN AD HOC BASIS?

A: WELL, EACH SITUATION HAS ITS OWN DYNAMICS, AND AS IS IMPLIED IN YOUR QUESTION, THERE ARE TWO DIFFERENT AREAS OF THE WORLD -- IF YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT SOUTHEAST ASIA ON ONE HAND AND WE ARE TALKING ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST IN THIS CONNECTION. BUT AS I HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT, WHAT WE WERE FACING WAS A CRITICAL SITUATION THAT INVOLVED THE US AND THE USSR. SO THAT THE EUROPEAN INTEREST IN THE INDIVISIBILITY OF SECURITY WE FEEL OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION IN THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARDS WHAT THE UNITED STATES WAS ATTEMPTING TO DO IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

Q: BUT PROXIMITY IS NOT THE ONLY ELEMENT THAT ENTERS INTO THIS INDIVISIBILITY, IS IT? I MEAN THERE COULD BE MANY OTHER FACTORS.

A: LET ME GO ON BACKGROUND HERE. WE ARE TALKING LESS ABOUT PROXIMITY OF AREA THAN WE ARE TALKING ABOUT A POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR. AND WE THINK THAT THEIR SECURITY INTERESTS SHOULD BE A CONSIDERATION.

Q: BOB, A BASIC QUESTION THAT ARISES ALL THE TIME -- AND THIS IS THE EUROPEAN CONCERN OBVIOUSLY, ABOUT OIL. AND THE UNITED STATES HAS TAKEN A POSITION, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, IN VARIOUS OIL TALKS, THAT IT WANTED TO WORK OUT A SHARING PROGRAM, BUT ONLY INVOLVING OIL IN INTERNATIONAL SHIPMENTS, NOT TOTAL WORLD OIL SUPPLY, BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES HAS A GREAT DEAL OF ITS OWN. IS THE UNITED STATES NOW READY TO TAKE THE EUROPEAN CONCERNS ON THIS THING INTO CONSIDERATION AND MAYBE RECONSIDER ITS POSITION ON THAT?

A: AS A POLICY MATTER, I JUST AM NOT EQUIPPED TO ANSWER THAT.

Q: I JUST WANTED TO RAISE IT AS A QUESTION.

A: I HAVE ALREADY SAID THAT WE ARE VERY MUCH AWARE OF WHAT HAPPENS IN EUROPE AS WE ARE WHAT HAPPENS HERE

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*****U N C L A S S I F I E D***** COPY

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WHEN THERE IS AN OIL EMBARGO. AND WE UNDERSTAND THE
CONCERNS OF THE EUROPEANS. WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT
POSSIBLE TO HAVE OIL PRODUCTION AND EXPORT RESTORED SO
THAT NO ONE SUFFERS FROM A CUT-OFF. KISSINGER
RT

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*****C O N F I D E N T I A L***** COPY

War
26 Oct

OP IMMED /ROUTINE
ESA061
DE RUESOR #3248/1 2991530
D R 261515Z OCT 73
FM USINT, CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4121

INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1308
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2728
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 3594
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1579
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3389
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2248

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 CAIRO 3248

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS/ PFOR MOPS EG PINT
SUBJECT: PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION CAIRO BAIRAM 1973
SUMMARY: EDUCATED EGYPTIANS CURRENTLY BELIEVE EGYPT
HAS ACHIEVED VICTORY, ALBEIT TARNISHED, AND THERE IS
NO APPARENT LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN EGYPTIAN POLITICAL
AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP. OPINION COULD CHANGE, IF
CERTAIN SERIOUS MILITARY REVERSES, SUCH AS DESTRUCTION
OR SURRENDER OF THIRD ARMY, TAKES PLACE. BITTERNESS
AND DISTRUST TOWARD US ROLE IN THE WAR GROWING EACH
DAY. EDITORIAL CRITICISM OF US HAS STEPPED UP IN PAST
THREE DAYS.

1. UNIVERSITY-EDUCATED CAIRENES, AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR, HELD THE NEAR-UNANIMOUS BELIEF THAT EGYPT HAD ACHIEVED A NECESSARY AND IMPOSING MILITARY VICTORY. ABOUT FIVE DAYS AGO, WHEN IMPRESSION OF SIZE AND SUCCESS OF ISRAELI MILITARY FORCE WEST OF CANAL SLOWLY BECAME KNOWN, OPINION SHIFTED SOMEWHAT. THE EDUCATED EGYPTIAN CONTINUOUSLY SAYS AND PROBABLY BELIEVES EGYPT'S VICTORY IS TARNISHED BUT A VICTORY NONETHELESS. HE WILL PROBABLY HOLD THIS BELIEF IF A CEASEFIRE BECOME EFFECTIVE ACCORDING TO THE SC RESOLUTIONS. HE WOULD ONLY BEGIN TO THINK DEFEAT IF EGYPT SUFFERED ONE OF SEVERAL POSSIBLE SERIOUS REVERSES (I.E., FALL OF SUEZ CITY OR OTHER SIGNIFICANT POPULATION CENTERS, SURRENDER OR DESTRUCTION OF THIRD ARMY, BOMBING OF CAIRO).

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2. REACTION AMONG EDUCATED EGYPTIANS TO INFORMATION (ALBEIT CONFUSED AND SOMETIMES LACKING CREDIBILITY) ABOUT THE ISRAELI FORCE WEST OF CANAL HAS SHIFTED FROM ONE OF AMAZEMENT AND DISBELIEF TO ONE OF SOMBERNESS AS THEY RELUCTANTLY SPECULATE WHETHER VICTORY WILL BE TAKEN FROM THEM AND WONDER IF ISRAEL WILL MAKE FURTHER MILITARY GAINS BEFORE CEASEFIRE BECOMES A REALITY.

3. QUESTIONS INDICATING FRUSTRATION AND DISSATISFACTION WITH THE AMBIGUOUS AND INCREASINGLY NEGATIVE MILITARY SITUATION ABOUND: "WHY WAS THE CEASEFIRE ACCEPTED SO QUICKLY?...WE SHOULD HAVE INSISTED ON UN PEACE OBSERVERS BEING IN PLACE BEFORE CEASEFIRE CAME INTO EFFECT." "WHY DID THE ARMY STOP AND DIG IN, IN THE SINAI, AFTER THE FIRST TWO DAYS? THEY SHOULD HAVE GONE ALL THE WAY WHEN THEY HAD THE INITIATIVE." "THE ARMY SHOULD HAVE GONE TO THE MITLA PASS INSTEAD OF STRINGING ITSELF OUT IN THE OPEN DESERT." "HOW COULD THE ARMY HAVE LEFT THE GREAT BITTER LAKE UNDEFENDED?" "WHY DOESN'T THE REST OF THE ARMY JOIN IN NOW? WE CAN'T REALLY BE DOWN TO THE HOME GUARD."

4. DESPITE QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS OF THIS NATURE THERE IS LITTLE INDICATION YET OF LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN THE FIGHTING ABILITY OF THE ARMY OR THE SUFFICIENCY AND QUALITY OF IT WEAPONS. QUESTIONS USUALLY INDICATE DISAGREEMENT AND DISSATISFACTION WITH CERTAIN MILITARY DECISIONS. BUT, AS YET, PEOPLE SEEM NOT TO BE WILLING TO FIX BLAME ON ANYONE FOR THE DECISIONS THEY CONSIDER QUESTIONABLE. THE ARMY, HIGH COMMAND AND PRESIDENT SADAT COULD BECOME THE SCAPEGOATS, BUT THEIR IMAGE HAS BEEN SO EXALTED IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS THAT THE PUBLIC IS, AT THE MOMENT, RELUCTANT TO TURN ON THEM, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE THE IT DOES NOT ASSES THE WAR AS A DEFEAT. HOWEVER, SADAT, THE VICTOR IN WAR, IS FACED WITH A POTENTIAL "I TOLD YOU SO" CHALLENGE FROM SEVERAL POSSIBLE QUARTERS, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH IS THE ARMY. IF THE AMBIGUOUS CONTINUING WARFARE/CEASEFIRE SITUATION IS PROLONGED...IF EGYPT SUFFERS A COMBINATION OF MILITARY REVERSES MENTIONED EARLIER IN THIS TELEGRAM...IF THERE IS NO MOVEMENT AT THE UN TO IMPLEMENT A PEACE RESOLUTION SERVING EGYPT'S INTERESTS, PRESIDENT SADAT'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP POSITION COULD BE IN QUESTION. EGYPTIANS COULD FAULT THEIR POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IF THEY SEE THEIR "MILITARY VICTORY" STOLEN FROM THEM THROUGH DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING AFTER SACRIFICING LIVES OF THOUSANDS OF YOUNG MEN.

5. THE SOVIETS TOO ARE POTENTIAL SCAPEGOATS, IF THE POLITICAL SITUATION DETERIORATES. THE SOVIETS SEEM TO BE CAPITALIZING SOMEWHAT ON THEIR ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT

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DURING THE PAST TWO WEEKS. TODAY EGYPTIAN PRESS TRIED TO IMPRESS READING PUBLIC WITH ALLEGED SOVIET READINESS TO SEND PEACEKEEPING TROOPS TO THE MF AT RISK OF NUCLEAR WARFARE. HOWEVER, THE LEVEL AND AIMS OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE IS COMING INTO GREATER QUESTION IN MORE POLITICALLY SOPHISTICATED CIRCLES. THERE APPEARS TO BE AN INCREASING NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT WILLINGNESS OF SOVIET UNION TO HELP EGYPT THROW IDF OFF WEST BANK OF CANL; THIS HAS, MOREOVER, LED TO QUESTIONS ABOUT SOVIET MOTIVES IN NOT SENDING FORCES TO EGYPT TO COUNTER AN INCREASINGLY THREATENING ISRAELI POSITION.

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INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1309
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2729
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 3595
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1580
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3390
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2249

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 CAIRO 3248

6. THE US IS INCREASINGLY BECOMING THE SCAPEGOAT FOR THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY REVERSES THAT ARE KNOWN TO THE EGYPTIAN PUBLIC. BITTERNESS AND DISTRUST TOWARD THE US IS GROWING EACH DAY BECAUSE OF THE INCREASING "EVIDENCE" THAT US IS GIVING "ALL-OUT SUPPORT OF ISRAEL." THE PRESS HAS BEEN UNEMOTIONAL BUT THOROUGH IN DEALING WITH US SUPPORT TO ISRAEL. THE READING PUBLIC HAS BEEN EXPOSED TO DETAILED REPORTING ON: CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS OF \$2 MILLION IN EMERGENCY AID TO ISRAEL, UNSTINTING US MILITARY RESUPPLY, INCLUDING F-4'S, US CONGRESSIONAL AND PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF ISRAEL, ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT OF US VOLUNTEERS AND PILOTS, US RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT OVER ARAB TERRITORY, US REFUSAL TO SEND PEACEKEEPING FORCES TO ME, ETC. TODAY'S PRESS UNDERLINED "US TOTAL SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL" BY GIVING MAXIMUM PLAY TO THE US GLOBAL STRATEGIC ALERT STORY AND INTERPRETING IT AS PROOF THAT THE US WILL GO TO ANY EXTREME TO ASSIST ISRAEL IN GAINING VICTORY. EGYPTIAN EDITORIALS SINCE BEGINNING OF WAR GENERALLY REFRAINED FROM ATTACKING US DIRECTLY FOR ITS AID ISRAEL, BUT IN LAST THREE DAYS EDITORIAL CRITICISM OF US HAS STEPPED UP CONSIDERABLY. THIS CRITICISM HAS BEEN QUICKLY ECHOED BY UNIVERSITY EDUCATED EGYPTIANS AND THE READING PUBLIC IN GENERAL. THOSE WHO ARE BITTER FEEL US WAS PARTY TO ISRAELI DECEPTION OVER CEASEFIRE AND THAT US WANTS TO DEPRIVE EGYPT OF FULL VICTORY AND, IF POSSIBLE, TURN EGYPT'S VICTORY INTO

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DEFEAT. MANY DESPAIR OF THOUGHT THAT US CAN POSSIBLY
BE IMPARTIAL IN FUTURE PEACE NEGOTIATION AND LOOK FOR
ACTION, RATHER THAN WORDS, TO INDICATE THAT IT WANTS A
JUST AND PEACEFUL ME SETTLEMENT. SMITH
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WAR
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TO USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 1307

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 4119

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CAIRO 3246
USIAC

E.O. 11652: N/A

SUBJECT: CAIRO PRESS REACTION - OCTOBER 26

1. AL-AHRAM

SIX BANNERHEADS DEALT WITH: "WORLD NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION CAUSED BY ME WAR."; MOSCOW WARNING TO WASHINGTON THAT "IT WOULD DO ANYTHING TO FULFILL ITS CEASEFIRE ASSURANCE."; U.S. NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCE ON STANDBY; U.S. RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT FLYING OVER EGYPT; AND TENSE MILITARY SITUATION ON CANAL FRONT DUE TO "REPEATED ISRAELI CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS."

MAIN STORY REPORTED NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION BEGINNING IN WASHINGTON WHEN SOVIET AMBASSADOR SUBMITTED NOTE STATING "USSR IS READY TO ACT UNILATERALLY, IF U.S. DOES NOT WISH TO SHARE IN JOINT EFFORT TO PREVENT ISRAEL FROM IGNORING SC CEASEFIRE RESOLUTIONS AND DELIBERATELY VIOLATING CEASEFIRE."

SEPARATE SUBHEAD STORY COVERED U.S. STRATEGIC ALERT, STORY INCLUDED KISSINGER'S STATEMENT THAT "U.S. OPPOSES UNILATERAL DISPATCH OF FORCES TO ME BY MAJOR POWERS, ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR POWERS, UNDER ANY PRETEXT," AND SC RESOLUTION CALLING FOR FORMATION INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY FORCE EXCLUDING SC PERMANENT MEMBERS.

BONN WIRE SERVICE STORY REPORTED WEST GERMAN MEASURES TO PREVENT ARMS FROM U.S. DEPOTS IN WEST GERMANY GOING TO ISRAEL.

SINGLE COLUMN STORIES REPORTED U.S. RECONNAISSANCE PLANES WERE TRACKED ON RADAR OVER EGYPT, AND FIRST CONTINGENT OF U.S. EMERGENCY FORCE ARRIVED IN EGYPT FROM CYPRUS.

MAIN FOREIGN PAGE STORY FROM BEIRUT MAINTAINED THAT ARAB OIL STATES "WILL NOT LIFT RESTRICTIONS ON OIL SHIPMENTS TO U.S. AFTER CEASEFIRE."

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ON FEATURE PAGE, NYT'S LESLY GILB SAID BRITAIN, ITALY TURKEY AND GREECE REFUSED PASSAGE OF U.S. ARMS TO ISRAEL THROUGH THEIR TERRITORY FOR FEAR OF ARAB OIL CUTS.

LEAD LOCAL PAGE STORY COVERED REMARKS OF PRESIDENTIAL PRESS ADVISOR, AHSRAE GHORBAL, "U.S. WAS 'ANXIOUS' FOR CEASE-FIRE, BUT DAYAN SAID HE WOULD USE CEASEFIRE TO BOLSTER ISRAELI FORCES WEST OF CANAL." GHORBAL ALSO SAID U.S. MILITARY EQUIPMENT WAS SHIPPED "DIRECTLY TO SINAI BATTLEFIELD THUS USING EGYPTIAN TERRITORY TO ATTACK DEEPER INTO EGYPT." HE STATED U.S. "FOR SIX YEARS IGNORED OUR PEACEFUL EFFORTS AND EXPLICIT DEMANDS TO RETRIEVE OUR LANDS FULLY."

HEIKAL IN WEEKLY EDITORIAL, DISCUSSED U.S. ARMS RE-SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL. HE SAID "AFTER FIRST TEN DAYS OF WAR, THE EGYPTIAN POLITICAL DECISION MAKER FOUND HIMSELF CONFRONTED WITH DIRECT U.S. INTERVENTION."

MAIN EDITORIAL CONSIDERED "INCREDIBLE" KISSINGER'S THURSDAY PRESS STATEMENT THAT U.S. IS CONCERNED ABOUT "FINDING SOLUTION ON WHICH PEACE CAN BE BASED." EDITORIAL JUXTAPOSED U.S. WAR AID TO ISRAEL WITH ITS DISREGARD FOR ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDING U.S. INTEREST IN MAINTAINING ACCESS TO ARAB OIL.

COLUMNIST AHMED BABA EL-DIN MAINTAINED THAT WITHOUT "UNUSUAL, QUICK AND HEAVY" U.S. AID, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE FOCED REAL DISASTER.

2. AL-AKHBAR

SEVEN BANNERHEADS DESCRIBED U.S. GLOBAL STRATEGIC ALERT AS "MILITARY DEMONSTRATION TO SUPPORT ISRAEL," AND MENTIONED "STRONG" SOVIET NOTE TO WASHINGTON THAT "SOVIET FORCES WILL GO TO ME."

U.S. STRATEGIC ALERT WAS COVERED UNDER FOUR-COLUMN HEADLINE DESCRIBING STEP AS "GRAVES SINCE CUBAN MISSILES CRISIS."

FRONTPAGE CENTER STORY COVERED PRESIDENTIAL PRESS ADVISOR'S REMARKS UNDER HEADLINE "WE FIGHT ENEMY USING U.S. VOLUNTEERS... U.S. ARMS ARE SHIPPED DIRECTLY TO BATTLEFIELD."

FORMATION OF UN EMERGENCY FORCE INDICATING NON-PARTICIPATION OF FIVE MAJOR POWERS WAS COVERED UNDER TWO COLUMN HEADLINES.

LOCAL PAGE QUOTED NYT STORY ON WEST GERMAN AND PORTUGUESE COOPERATION IN AIRLIFTING U.S. ARMS TO ISRAEL.

MAIN EDITORIAL INTERPRETED U.S. STRATEGIC ALERT AS "PRETEXT TO SUPPORT ISRAEL'S ANTI-ARAB WAR," AND "AS ACTUAL INVOLVEMENT IN ISRAEL'S MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST EGYPT AND SYRIA."

ON SAME THEME, FRONTPAGE COLUMNIST MOUSSA SABRI SAID "U.S. IMPERIALISM IS PLACING ENTIRE WORLD ON BRINK OF WAR BECAUSE ISRAEL WAS DEFEATED IN SINAI."

COLUMNIST RIFAAT EL-MAHQOUB DESCRIBED STRATEGIC ALERT AS "OVERT U.S. INTERVENTION ON ISRAEL'S SIDE."

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AL-AKHBAR BACKPAGE COLUMNIST ANIS MANSOUR SAID THAT
"(EGYPTIAN) BELIEF IN GOD ... IS STRONGER THAN POISON US
IMPERIALIST RADIO LOUDSPEAKERS FROM TEL AVIV, VOA 'R LONDON'."

3. AL-GOMHOURIYA

FIRST OF FIVE BANNERHEADS STATED BOTH SOVIET AND AMERICAN
FORCES ARE IN STATE OF ALERT.

MAIN FOREIGN PAGE STORY REPORTED ONE BILLION DOLLARS
IN U.S. ARMS TO ISRAEL. THREE-COLUMN BLIRUT AND WASHI OTI
WIRE SERVICES STORY REPORTED CONTINUING ARAB OIL REDUCTION
TO U.S.

BONN REQUEST THAT U.S. STOP USING WEST GERMAN
TERRITORY IN AIRLIFTING ARMS TO ISRAEL WAS PUBLISHED
IN TWO FOREIGN PAGE COLUMNS.

BRIEF FOREIGN PAGE ITEMS REPORTED U.S. RECONNAISSANCE
FLIGHTS OVER SYRIA. PRESIDENT PRESS ADVISOR'S
STATEMENT WAS PUBLISHED ON LOCAL PAGE STRESSING US
SHIPPING ARMS TO ISRAEL DIRECTLY TO SINAI BATTLE-
FIELD.

4. COMMENT

MAIN TOPIC IN ALL PAPERS WAS PRESUMED POTENTIAL
US/SOVIET NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION OVER THE WAR. COM-
MENTATORS CONSIDERED US STRATEGIC ALERT AN INDICATION
OF OPEN AND OVERWHELMING SUPPORT TO ISRAEL.
NEWS OF US STRATEGIC ALERT (IN DEFENSE OF ISRAEL,
AS IT IS SEEN IN CAIRO) CAPPED A PERIOD OF UNREMITTING
INDICATIONS (I.E., NO DECREASE IN US ARMS RESUPPLY,
US PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS, US\$ 2 BILLION
DOLLAR MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS, MILLIONS DONATED TO
ISRAEL BY US PRIVATE CITIZENS, UNWILLINGNESS OF US
TO COMMIT PEACEKEEPING FORCES, ETC.) OF "OVERWHELMING"
US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL. DOUBT AND DISTRUST OF US IN-
TENTIONS REGARDING CEASEFIRE AND PEACE RESOLUTION IS
INCREASING NOTICEABLY.

SMITH
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WAR
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INFO USINT CAIRO PRIORITY 2536
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 5577
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 7397
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 4789
USMISSION USUN PRIORITY 156
AMEMBASSY JORDA PRIORITY 2419
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2716

S E C R E T AMMAN 5706

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MUPS, JU, SY
SUBJ: SITUATION IN SYRIA

1. KING SAYS THAT SITUATION IS CONFUSED. HE HAS JUST HEARD FROM JORDANIAN CHARGE THERE THAT SYRIANS AND IRAQIS HAVE HAD A MAJOR QUARREL. IRAQIS ACCUSE SYRIANS OF ACCEPTING CEASE-FIRE WITHOUT CONSULTATION. THEY ARE THREATENING TO WITHDRAW THEIR TROOPS.

2. I TOLD KING THAT THIS WAS A DELIGHTFUL BIT OF NEWS, IF TRUE. HE SAID HE WAITING RETURN OF AMER KHAMMASH TONIGHT. IF IRAQIS PULL OUT, HE WILL HESITATE A BIT BEFORE WITHDRAWING JORDANIAN TROOPS. HE ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT. I SAID, IF IRAQIS WITHDRAW IN ANGER, IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR AREA IF JORDANIANS LEFT IN A FRIENDLY WAY AND THAT A SHORT TIME GAP BETWEEN IRAQI DEPARTURE AND THAT OF JORDAN WOULD NOT BE BAD. IF, HOWEVER, IRAQIS STAY, GIVEN THEIR TEMPER, IT WOULD BE BEST OF JORDANIANS GOT OUT FAST.

3. KING ASKED THAT SECRETARY BE TOLD HE HAD LISTENED TO PRESS CONFERENCE ON VOA AND THAT IT WAS A MAGNIFICENT PERFORMANCE.
BROWN
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 8395
USINT CAIRO 1072
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 5887
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 838
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4581
USMISSION USUN NY 2493
ZEN/USINT BAGHDAD BY POUCH

S E C R E T BEIRUT 12491

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, XF

SUBJECT: SOVIET VIEWS ON MIDDLE EAST SITUATION
IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF EVENING OCT. 25, SOV OFFICIAL
(KNOWN TO BE AFFILIATED WITH KGB) MADE FOUR POINTS ON
PRESENT SITUATION IN MIDDLE EAST:

1) NEITHER EGYPT NOR USSR HAD CONSULTED OR INFORMED
SYRIA IN ADVANCE ABOUT AGREEMENT ON CEASE FIRE AND SC
RES. 338.

2) ARAFAT TOLD SOV OFFICIAL EARLIER OCT. 25 HE
INTENDED RESPECT CEASE FIRE PROVIDED RIGHTS OF PAL-ESTINIANS
PROPERLY PROTECTED.

3) IRAQI BAAATH PARTY LEADERS EXPECTED MEET IN BAGHDAD
OCT. 25 AND AGREE TO SOFTPEDAL IRAQI OPPOSITION TO SC
RESOLUTIONS AND CEASEFIRE.

4) EARLY ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM EGYPTIAN TERRITORY
TAKEN AFTER OCT. 22 CEASEFIRE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO
POSITION OF SADAT AND ALSO TO FUTURE SOV RELATIONS WITH AND
POLICY TOWARD ARAB STATES. THIS ALSO VERY IMPORTANT TEST
OF WHETHER OR NOT US AND USSR ABLE ENSURE THAT AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN TWO OF THEM ARE CARRIED OUT BY THIRD PARTIES.

BUFFUM
BT

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S E C R E T

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WAR

26 OCT

TOP IMMEDIATE
RHP503BLA158
AL RHPDUL 1552Z 2991527
261525Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BOMB

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 310

SECRET 1552Z

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: CDS

TAGS: FROK, XF, GW

SUBJECT: MOVEMENT OF US MILITARY MATERIAL FROM FRO

REF: DNN 15450

1. ISRAELI EMBASSY CALLED EARLY OCT. 26 TO ASK FOR US
ADVICE ABOUT MOVING THE REMAINING US MILITARY MATERIAL
FROM BREMERHAVEN TO ISRAEL BY SHIP. HE TOLD HIM THAT
AS MATTERS NOW STAND, THE FRO AUTHORITIES ARE REFUSING
TO PERMIT THE LOADING OF THE REMAINING MATERIAL, WHICH
CONSISTS OF ABOUT 100 TRUCKS AND 75,000 105MM ROUNDS OF
AMMUNITION. HE SAID THAT DESPITE STRONG REPRESENTA-
TIONS BY THE AMBASSADOR AND THE DCM IN THE
PAST FEW DAYS, MADE ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM WASHINGTON,
THE GERMAN POSITION APPEARED TO BE FIRM.

2. THE ISRAELI EMBASSY WONDERED WHETHER THE GERMANS
MIGHT BE WILLING TO PERMIT SHIPMENT OF THE AMMO
AND SOME OF THE TRUCKS BY A VESSEL, NAMED OPAL, WHICH
IS PRESENTLY ENROUTE TO NORTHERN GERMANY FROM THE
MEDITERRANEAN AND IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE ABOUT THE
MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK. THE OPAL IS FLYING A
LIBERIAN FLAG BUT HAS AN ISRAELI CAPTAIN AND CREW.
ISRAELI EMBASSY THOUGHT THAT SHIPPING THE MATERIAL ON
THIS VESSEL MIGHT ALLOW THE GERMANS SOME MANEUVERING
ROOM WITH THE ARABS. WE UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THIS
IDEA TO WASHINGTON ON A PRIORITY BASIS, ALTHOUGH WE
NOTED THAT THE PRESENT GERMAN POSITION WOULD SEEM TO
PRECLUDE ANY SHIPPING OF MATERIAL FROM FRO TERRITORY OR
ANY SHIPS OF WHATEVER NATIONALITY.

3. COMMENT: SHOULD WASHINGTON BE CONSIDERING THE
ADVISABILITY OF THE HIGH-LEVEL OF OFFICIAL TO THE

***** WWSK COMMENT *****

SUNNEWELL, J. SANNING, STOKEL

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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SUGGESTED IN REFTEL, IT MIGHT
BE USEFUL TO CONSIDER OFFERING THE GERMANS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO SHIPPING BY ISRAELI VESSELS: THE USE
OF THE LIBERIAN VESSEL MENTIONED ABOVE MIGHT PROVIDE
THEM WITH A POSSIBLE OUT.
HILLENBRAND
BT

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WAR
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OP IMMEDIATE /ROUTINE
ESA115ADA969
DE RUESAD #8654 2991545
O R 261457Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0292

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 6480
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 5035
USINT CAIRO 3621
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 5020
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3926

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 8654

SB D 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, IS

SUBJECT: ATTITUDE OF LABOR ALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP TOWARD MID EAST
SITUATION

SUMMARY: MRS MEIR AND DAYAN, MEETING LAST EVENING WITH
LABOR ALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP, SAID IN EFFECT THAT US ACTION IN
PRODUCING RES. 338 AND ISRAEL'S RAPID ACCEPTANCE OF IT
WERE WISE MOVES MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY, IN TERMS OF BOTH
PRESERVING INDISPENSABLE US SUPPORT OF ISRAEL AND SEEKING
SETTLEMENT IN REGION. FROM ALL INDICATIONS, LEADERSHIP WAS
FULLY SATISFIED AND SHARES MRS MEIR'S PERSONAL TRUST IN
PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY. PRESENT MOMENT MAY BE MORE
AUSPICIOUS FOR MOVING GOI TOWARD MID EAST NEGOTIATIONS
THAN MAY BE CASE A FEW WEEKS FROM NOW. END SUMMARY.

1. IN ADDITION TO VIRTUALLY CONTINUOUS CABINET MEETING YESTERDAY
STARTING AT SIX IN MORNING, MRS MEIR CONVENED COMBINED
MEETING LAST EVENING OF LABOR ALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP AND
ALIGNMENT KNESSET FACTION. SHE AND DAYAN SPOKE.

2. MRS MEIR REPORTEDLY SAID:

A. ISRAEL HAD EMERGED FROM GREAT DANGER IN CONNECTION WITH
US-SOVIET CONFRONTATION OVER ISSUE OF INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET
TROOPS IN MIDDLE EAST

B. DIRE CONSEQUENCES COULD HAVE ARISEN IF ISRAEL HAD NOT
ACCEPTED CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL

C. US AID TO ISRAEL HAD BEEN XCELLENT: GOI ACCEPTANCE OF US
INITIATIVE IN AUGUST 1970 HAD MADE ISRAEL'S DEFENSIVE BUILDUP

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

HAK, SCOWCROFT, LL, SAUNDERS.

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OF PAST THREE YEARS POSSIBLE
D. CURRENTLY SOVIET THREATS WERE BRUTAL AND WERE EVEN GREATER
THAN THOSE LEVELLED AGAINST ISRAEL BY BULGANIN IN 1956
E. NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARAB COUNTRIES WERE NOT YET IN SIGHT.

3. DAYAN REPORTEDLY SAID:

A. ISRAEL COULD NOT AFFORD TO JEOPARDIZE US SUPPORT BY
PREEMPTIVE MILITARY ACTION AT BEGINNING OF WAR
B. IF ISRAEL HAD TURNED DOWN CEASEFIRE PROPOSAL, IT WOULD HAVE
TAKEN ON GREATER DANGER THAN IT COULD AFFORD
C. SPEED OF US-USSR INITIATIVE OCTOBER 20-11 HAD CAUSED
DIFFICULTIES IN ISRAELI-US RELATIONS, BUT WEIGHED AGAINST THEM
WERE TREMENDOUS MATERIAL ADVANTAGES FOR ISRAEL; US WAS
PERHAPS ISRAEL'S ONLY REMAINING SUPPORT AGAINST ARABS
D. ISRAELIS HAD TO REALIZE THAT FOR POLITICAL REASONS
IDF COULD NOT INFLICT DESTRUCTION OF ARAB ARMIES AND THEIR
WEAPONS
E. WAR HAD LEFT ISRAEL IN GOOD STRATEGIC POSITION AND HAD
LEFT ARABS INCAPABLE OF RENEWING ATTACK ON ISRAEL
F. ISRAEL COULD NOT ACHIEVE POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF MID EAST
CONFLICT BY OCCUPYING ARAB CAPITALS, AND GOI HAD NO INTENTION
OF GOING THIS ROUTE.

4. WE NOTE THAT HAIM ZADOK, CHAIRMAN OF KNESSET COMMITTEE
ON SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TOLD US TODAY THAT MRS MEIR'S
REFERENCE TO BRUTAL SOVIET THREATS (SEE ABOVE) DID NOT MEAN
THAT GOI HAD RECEIVED ANY SOVIET MESSAGES THROUGH THIRD PARTIES
ADDRESSED DIRECTLY TO ISRAEL.

5. OUR ESTIMATE OF ATTITUDE OF LABOR LZ434#80 635344-6 -1, 594-6,
BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH ZADOK AND SOME NON-OFFICIAL
OBSERVERS, IS AS FOLLOWS.

6. BEFORE LAST EVENING'S MEETING, THERE HAD BEEN UNDERCURRENT
OF DISSATISFACTION OVER FACT THAT US DID NOT CONSULT GOI IN
ADVANCE OVER TERMS OF UNSC RES 338. THERE ALSO HAD
BEEN SOME CONCERN OVER RAPID CABINET DECISION TO ACCEPT
RES, WHICH HAD INVOLVED ALMOST NO ISRAELI
POLITICAL CONSULTATION.

7. MRS MEIR AND DAYAN CARRIED THE DAY WITH THEIR PRESENTA-
TIONS. IT IS CLEAR THAT MRS MEIR PERSONALLY TRUSTS PRESIDENT
AND SECRETARY. LABOR LEADERSHIP SHARES THIS TRUST. IT IS NOW
ACCEPTED THAT BOTH US INITIATIVE AND GOI ACCEPTANCE OF
IT WERE SOUND. THERE LINGERS AT THE SAME TIME HOPE THAT ISRAEL
DID NOT CREATE UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT IN US-ISRAELI RELATIONS BY
RAPIDLY ACCEPTING RES 338 AS FAIT ACCOMPLI.

8. BASED ON INFO AVAILABLE TO US, IT APPEARS THAT

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FOLLOWING EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS OF YESTERDAY, LARGE ALIGNMENT LEADERSHIP WIDELY SUPPORTS GOI POSITION IN HAVING FOLLOWED US LEAD IN VARIOUS INITIATIVE TAKEN SO FAR, IN AND OUTSIDE UN CONTEXT, TO STOP WAR. FURTHERMORE, LEADERSHIP IS WILLING TO GRANT POSSIBILITY THAT NOW, SOMEWHERE, US WILL BE ABLE TO ORGANIZE MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATING PROCESS. AT SAME TIME, THERE IS CERTAINLY NO MOOD OF OPTIMISM THAT SOLUTION TO MID EAST CONFLICT MAY BE IN SIGHT.

9. COMMENT: AS I SEE SITUATION, ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT AT THIS MOMENT WHICH MIGHT MAKE OUR JOB OF LEADING ISRAEL INTO DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS EASIER TODAY THAN THIS MAY PROVE A FEW WEEKS FROM NOW.

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CIA (LDX)

NSA (LDX)

PA/RO

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #64

Situation Report in the Middle East as of (1800) EDT, 10/25

Cease-Fire

Israel informs us that it is cooperating fully with UNTSO regarding deployment of observers both in the north and south. Two UNTSO teams from Cairo are taking up positions on the west bank of the Canal on the Israeli side of the line. Six of the seven units destined for the Egyptian side are now in place and reporting.

The Israelis claim that the Egyptian Third Army is totally isolated on the east bank of the Suez Canal between Great Bitter Lake and Suez City. They also claim the IDF controls all supply lines from Egypt to Suez City and the Third Army, and that the Israeli navy is patrolling the northern Gulf of Suez. Therefore, they effectively blockade the coast of the Third Army area. The IDF reports that Egyptian forces on the east side of the Canal consist of approximately 30,000 men and 200 tanks.

On the Syrian side, 3 UN observer teams have reached the forward IDF position on the Golan Heights and have set up operations.

The Egyptian reaction to the Israeli penetration into the west bank and the second cease-fire is one of confusion and disbelief. Hard questions have begun to be asked. The Cairo press is trying to down-play the extent of the Israeli presence and calm doubts about the military situation.

The Saudis are reported to be relieved over the cease-fire, but skeptical as to its duration and its ultimate significance. Embassy Jidda does not

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expect the Saudis to revoke the steps they have taken in regard to oil until the outline of a settlement acceptable to Saudi Arabia becomes clear.

Major fedayeen leaders (Fatah and Saiqa) in Lebanon have reportedly agreed to cease border activities on condition that Israel observe the ceasefire and subsequently publicly recognize Palestinian rights and the Palestinian cause. The Lebanese are seeking assurances from smaller fedayeen groups. The GOL tells us it is doing all it can to keep the border with Israel quiet.

Security Council Resolution

The Security Council adopted the revised eight-power resolution at approximately 1530 EDT. The vote was 14 in favor, with China not participating. The latest resolution demands an immediate ceasefire and a return to positions occupied at 1650 GMT on October 22, calls for an increase in the number of UN observers on both sides, and decides to set up a UN Emergency Force composed of personnel from UN member states except permanent members of the Security Council.

FRG Opposition to US Arms Shipments

In response to Ambassador Hillenbrand's presentation of USG views today, the FRG remained firm in its position that no further US arms shipments to Israel be made from the FRG. According to the FRG, there are "massive pressures" from the Arab governments on the FRG, and the Arabs have charged that weapons deliveries from the FRG helped the Israelis counter the Arab offensive and establish the bridgehead on the west bank of the Suez Canal. The FRG expressed particular concern about a possible Arab oil boycott. The FRG asked that the USG reciprocate previous German understanding in the earlier phases of the Middle East conflict by showing an understanding now for the difficult German position.

Israeli Relations with Africa

Nigeria announced today that it had broken relations with Israel. The reason given was that Israel had

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advanced beyond the 1967 ceasefire lines on the West Bank of the Suez Canal. Liberia reportedly finds itself in a difficult position because of breaks with Israel by Nigeria and Ethiopia, and will be reconsidering the issue of breaking relations with Israel tomorrow or the next day.

Syrians and Egyptians Accuse U.S. of Reconnaissance Flights

The Syrians have reportedly accused the U.S. of resuming "spy flights", claiming that an unmanned SR-71 penetrated their airspace this morning and then returned to Israel. Egypt claimed the U.S. conducted two overflights of Egyptian territory at high altitude today.

APPROVED BY: 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET/EXDIS



Department of State

War
TELEGRAM

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ORIGIN NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EB-11 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 CCO-00

CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01

PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19 IO-14 COME-00

TRSE-00 CG-00 FMC-04 OMB-01 /136 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/ARP:GOLUMSDEN, JR.:JMP

APPROVED BY NEA/ARP:FMDICKMAN

EB/ORF/FSE = MR. MAU (INFO)

NEA TASK FORCE = MR. KORN

DOD/ISA = MR. SCHAEFFER (INFO)

S/S-0 = K. KURZE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY

AMCONSUL DHAHRAN PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY

SECDEF PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 211292

SECDEF FOR ISA

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: ENRG, PFOR, SA, BA

SUBJ: BUNKERING OF USG AND USG-CHARTERED VESSELS AT SAUDI
AND BAHRAIN OIL TERMINALS

1. OIL COMPANY REPS HAVE INFORMED US THAT SAG, IN ADDITION
TO PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED EMBARGO MEASURES AGAINST U.S. AND
U.S. FORCES, HAS ORDERED ARAMCO NOT RPT NOT TO PROVIDE
BUNKERS EITHER TO U.S. NAVY VESSELS OR TO ANY SHIPS UNDER
CHARTER TO U.S. MILITARY. LATTER TO INCLUDE COMMERICAL

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TANKERS CHARTERED BY MILITARY SEA COMMAND (MSC) TO TRANS-
PORT EVERGREEN CONTRACT PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO U.S. FORCES.

2. OTHER INDUSTRY SOURCES REPORT BAHRAINIS, AS
SAUDIS, ARE REFUSING LOAD EVERGREEN CARGOES, BUT ARE RPT
ARE STILL PERMITTING TANKERS TURNED AWAY AS RESULT OF
ARAB EMBARGO TO RECEIVE BUNKERS.

3. WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION ADDRESSEES
COULD PROVIDE ON SITUATIONS DESCRIBED ABOVE FROM TRADE
SOURCES, KISSINGER

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 INRE-00 USSS-00

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10

PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19

IO-14 AF-10 EUR-25 DRC-01 /159 W

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P R 251852Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRVXRITY 278
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
USINT CAIRO
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TEL AVIV 8615

E.O. 811652: GDS
TAGS: SPFOR, PINT, SY, IZ, JO
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN SYRIA

1. MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS DIRECTOR VERED OF MFA TOLD EMBOFF OCTOBER 25 THERE IS MAJOR STRUGGLE GOING ON WITHIN SARG OVER WHETHER TO CONTINUE WAR OR NOT. IRAQI FORCES NUMBERING THIRTY TO FORTY THOUSAND ARE IN SYRIA, DEMANDING CONTINUATION OF WAR AND AWAITING RIGHT MOMENT TO INTERVENE IN INTERNAL SARG STRUGGLE, PERHAPS BY FORCE.

2. MRS VERED SAID ASAD REGIME APPEARS IN SOME DANGER OF COLLAPSE, EVEN IF IRAQIS DO NOT INTERVENE BY FORCE. SHE ADDED THAT JORDANIAN FORCES IN SYRIA DO NOT COUNTERBALANCE IRAQI PRESENCE IN POLITICAL TERMS BECAUSE IT IS EVIDENT THEY PROBABLY WOULD NOT INTERVENE MILITARILY IN EVENT IRAQIS DO SO.

3. COMMENT. MFA OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN VERY CAUTIOUS IN DESCRIBING OFFICIAL GOI ATTITUDE TOWARD SYRIA'S ACCEPTANCE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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OF CEASEFIRE AND RESOLUTION 338. AT THIS POINT, GOI POSTURE, THEREFORE, IS BEST DESCRIBED AS "IF THEY DON'T SHOOT, WE DON'T SHOOT."

4. ISRAELI MEDIA HAVE REFLECTED GENERAL GOI CAUTION SAYING THAT GOI TOOK VIEW THAT SYRIA HAD NOT YET FORMALLY ACCEPTED CEASEFIRE BECAUSE ITS MESSAGE TO UNSYG DID NOT MEET PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF A CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT, DID NOT SPECIFY TIME FOR CEASEFIRE, AND POSED IRRELEVANT CONDITIONS. IF GOI ASSESSMENT OF SYRIAN INTERNAL SITUATION IS ALONG LINES GIVEN US BY MRS VERED ABOVE, IT IS POSSIBLE GOI WILL HOLD OFF OFFICIALLY ACKNOWLEDGING SYRIA'S REPORTED ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE AND RESOLUTION 338 UNTIL SITUATION IN SYRIA CLARIFIES ITSELF.
KEATING

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